Essays in experimental economics by Waichman, Israel
Essays in Experimental Economics
Israel Waichman
Department of Economics
Christian-Albrechts- University of Kiel
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor Scientiarum Politicarum.
Yet to be decided
Essays in Experimental Economics
Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenchaftlichen Fakulta¨t
der Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel
vorgelegt von
Israel Waichman, MA






Gedruckt mit Genehmigung der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t
der Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel
Dekan:
Prof. Dr. Thomas Lux
Erstberichterstattender:
Prof. Dr. Till Requate
Zweitberichterstattender:
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schmidt
Tag der Abgabe der Arbeit:
Ma¨rz 20, 2009
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung:
July 9, 2009
TO MY FAMILY
(Shlomo, Nina, Sharon and Anat)
Preface
The work presented in this thesis is a result of collaboration mainly
with my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Till Requate, but also with other
colleagues within the University of Kiel and outside it. Citation to
this thesis should be as presented below:
• Chapter 1 presents a joint study with Till Requate. Citation to
this study should take the form:
Waichman, I., and Requate, T. (2009), “On the role of person-
ality traits in oligopoly experiments”, University of Kiel, Mimeo
• Chapter 2 presents a joint study with Till Requate and Ch’ng
Kean Siang. Citation to this study should take the form:
Waichman, I., Requate, T., and Kean Siang C. (2008), “Man-
agers and students playing Cournot - experimental evidence from
Malaysia”, Economic Working Paper: 2008-19, University of Kiel
• Chapter 3 presents a joint study with Eva Camacho-Cuena and
Till Requate. Citation to this study should take the form:
Camacho-Cuene E., Requate T., and Waichman, I. (2009), “En-
vironmental policy incentives to adopt an advanced abatement
technology with asymmetric firms: An experimental approach”,
University of Kiel, Mimeo
• Citation to chapter 4 should take the form:
Waichman, I. (2009), “Empirical evidence from the Kiel market
for budget travel by train”, University of Kiel, Mimeo
• Appendix A presents a joint study with Helmut Herwartz. Ci-
tation to this study should take the form:
Herwartz, H., and Waichman, I. (2008), “A bootstrap approach
to Value-at-Risk Diagnostics”, University of Kiel, Mimeo
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Executive Summary
This thesis consists of studies in the field of experimental economics.
The first two chapters of the thesis deal with the issue of subject se-
lection in Cournot Oligopoly experiments. In particular, chapter 1
presents a study which was designed to test whether a predominant
personality inventory (NEO-PI-R) can account for differences in be-
havior between subjects in a Cournot Duopoly with random matching.
Chapter 2 investigates whether Malaysian managers behave differ-
ently than Malaysian students (and German students) in a Cournot
Triopoly. Chapter 3 presents a study in the field of environmental
economics that investigates whether the initial allocation of emission
permits and the auction design affect the adoption of advanced tech-
nology in a market with many small asymmetric firms, particularly,
when the regulator commits himself ex-ante to the level of permits.
Chapter 4 provides a natural investigation of a market sharing certain
features with the ultimatum bargaining game. The introduction of the
Schleswig-Holstein ticket (S-H ticket) by the German train company
created a market which is characterized by ‘proposers’ who offer to
take ‘responders’ with their ticket for a specified price. A deadline
imposed by the trains’ departure time on the bargainers transforms
the situation into an ultimatum bargaining situation. Chapter 4 thor-
oughly describes this market, which we refer to as the Kiel market for
budget travel by train. Finally, Appendix A presents a bootstrap ap-
proach to determine critical values for the dynamic quintile test as a
common diagnostic tool for model based Value-at-Risk estimates.
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Introduction
In recent years the use of experimental methods became an important tool in
Economics. In contrast to happenstance data, experimental data is identified by
some degree of control or internal validity1. Thus, experiments can test (the de-
scriptive validity of) economic theories, and can improve predictions in economic
situations when theory provides ambiguous results. Experiments may also trig-
ger the development of new hypotheses and theories, and serve as ‘test beds’ for
economic policies and regulations.
Experiments are conducted either in the laboratory, a controlled environment
allowing an isolation of the effect of the investigated variable, or, in the field.
This last example is a natural environment which allows, in general, less con-
trol over the variables being investigated. Harrison & List (2004) developed the
conventional taxonomy in distinguishing between laboratory and field experi-
ments. They distinguish between a conventional lab experiment, an artefactual
field experiment, a framed field experiment, and a natural field experiment. A
conventional lab experiment is a controlled experiment conducted with student
subjects and abstract framing. An artefactual field experiment is a conventional
lab experiment conducted with a non-standard subject pool (e.g. market pro-
fessionals, etc.). A framed field experiment is an artefactual field experiment
conducted with a particular field context. A natural field experiment is an ex-
periment conducted in an environment where the subjects naturally undertake
the task, without awareness that they are participants in an experiment. Since
artefactual and framed field experiments are basically lab experiments, they enjoy
a high degree of internal validity, but may suffer from a low degree of external
1Following Meyer (1995), internal validity refers to whether one can draw conclusion about
a change in the dependent variable as a result of a change in the explanatory variable.
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validity (the extent which results from the laboratory can be generalized to the
real-world). The opposite is true for natural field experiments.
This thesis presents four economic experiments conducted within a period of
two years (from December 2006 to November 2008), mainly at the experimental
economics laboratory of the University of Kiel. Using Harrison and Lists’ tax-
onomy, this thesis includes two conventional laboratory experiments (chapters 1
and 3), an artefactual field experiment (chapter 2), and a natural field experi-
ment (chapter 4). We deviate from Harison and List’s taxonomy by writing the
instructions and conducting each of the experiments featured in this thesis by
referring to the economic framing (rather than to the abstract framing). There
are several reasons for this: First, in the first two chapters we report the results
of Cournot Oligopoly experiments. In contrast to other laboratory experiments
(in economics), Oligopoly experiments are conducted by referring to the eco-
nomic framing rather than by referring to an abstract framing. In particular, the
random-matching experiments by Holt (1985) and Huck et al. (2001), to which
we refer to in chapter 1, and the experiment by Huck et al. (2004), whose design
was followed in chapter 2, were conducted by referring to the economic framing.
Huck et al. (2004) compared the results of Cournot Oligopoly experiments con-
ducted with and without an abstract framing and found that “[by referring to
an abstract framing] collusion may be difficult to achieve even in markets with
only two participants. In general, average quantities are closer to the Cournot
prediction than with an economic frame.” (Huck et al., 2004, p.444). The sec-
ond reason for referring to the economic framing is the relative complexity of the
experiment in chapter 3. Economic framing (context) may increase transparency
regarding the experiment. This follows Loewenstein (1999), who points out that
“a major discovery of cognitive psychology is the degree to which all forms of
thinking and problem solving are context-dependent, including such seemingly
straightforward tasks as language-comprehension” (Loewenstein, 1999, p.F30).
Moreover, Loewenstein also claims that “context-free [abstract framing] provides
the same amount of context, albeit somewhat more alien, as any other environ-
ment”(Loewenstein, 1999, p.F30).
The first two chapters of this thesis deal with the issue of subject selec-
tion in Cournot Oligopoly experiments. The classical quantity-setting (Cournot)
2
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Oligopoly is a prominent example of strategic interaction among firms. Experi-
ments on Cournot Oligopoly were among the first conducted in economics (Hog-
gatt, 1959; Selten & Sauermann, 1959). Since then, numerous experimental stud-
ies have been conducted in the area, providing us with better understanding of
the conditions that facilitate (and impede) collusion.2 However, although dealing
with a firm’s behavior, Cournot Oligopoly experiments were only conducted with
student subjects. The question that naturally arises is thus: Is there a substantial
external validity concern when conducting Cournot Oligopoly experiments with
students instead of firms (or firms’ managers)?
A first consideration regarding this question comes from Social-Psychology.
Psychologists have, already long ago, suggested that behavior is a function of the
individual’s personality and the specific situation3 (Lewin, 1936). Thus, if per-
sonality plays a crucial role in determining behavior, then experiments dealing
with the behavior of firms should be conducted with managers as subjects (simi-
larly, experiments dealing with governmental regulation should be conducted with
government officials). In contrast, if it is the situation which mainly determines
behavior, subject selection should not affect the experimental results. The prob-
lem is that we cannot observe internal causes of behavior, therefore we cannot
infer whether (and how much) personality affects behavior. That leads to a huge
controversy in psychology known as the personality-situation controversy.
In order to avoid the controversy, economists are following the principles of the
theory of induced valuation (Smith, 1976). This theory aims at inducing a general
conclusion about the economic situation regardless of the subject population. The
idea is to eliminate the innate characteristics of the subjects by paying them a
monetary reward. Ideally, the payment follows the principles of salience (the
reward depends on the subject’s action), and dominance (the subject’s utility
from the reward should dominate any other consideration when acting in the
experiment). Therefore, most economic experiments are conducted with students,
under the assumption that the results were influenced by the economic situation
(including the reward structure), and not by the heterogeneous characteristics of
2See Huck et al. (2004) for a survey.




the subjects. Moreover, the principles of saliency and dominance make it harder
to conduct experiments with a non-student population since it is quite costly to
pay market professionals, and managers especially (according to their opportunity
costs).
Inspecting the literature does not solve the question. The literature in exper-
imental economics provides contradicting evidence on the effect of subject pool
selection (in particular, students vs. managers) on subject’s performance. On
the one hand, there are studies that do not find substantial differences in perfor-
mance between students and managers. For instance, Cooper et al. (1999) found
that without a familiar context mangers of state enterprises in China did not per-
form better than students in a ‘ratchet effect game’. Montmarquette et al. (2004)
showed that managers in a large French-German pharmaceutical firm do not per-
form differently than students in a ‘real effort game’.4 Ball & Cech (1996) found
only little evidence of subject pool effect between students and market profession-
als in their review. On the other hand, some studies find that managers are more
cooperative than students. For instance, Fehr & List (2004) found that CEOs
from the coffee mill sector in Costa Rica are considerably more trusting and ex-
hibit more trustworthiness than students in a ‘trust game’. Alp´ızar et al. (2004),
using the same subject population, found that Costa Rican managers cooperate
(abate) significantly more than Costa Rican students in two ‘pollution compliance
games’. Similarly, Cooper (2006) in a study of a ‘corporate turnaround game’,
found that managers overcome a history of coordination failure significantly faster
than undergraduate subjects.
A two-fold approach is used to investigate the issue of subject pool selec-
tion in Cournot Oligopoly experiments. In chapter 1, we investigate whether a
predominant personality inventory (the NEO personality inventory revised) can
account for differences in behavior between subjects in a Cournot Duopoly ex-
periment. In chapter 2, we study whether Malaysian managers behave differently
than Malaysian students (and German students) in a Cournot Triopoly experi-
ment.
4Nevertheless, they find that students and managers differ in their strategies, students are
more cost-driven and managers are more objective-driven.
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In particular, chapter 1 presents an experimental investigation of whether and
which personality traits affect subjects’ behavior in a random-matching Cournot
Duopoly with complete information. We are particularly interested in the influ-
ence of personality under a random matching scheme, since a strategic relation-
ship with one partner cannot be established. Besides testing the effect of per-
sonality on performance, we challenge the results of previous random-matching
Cournot Duopoly experiments, by increasing substantially the gains from coop-
eration (inevitably, this also increases the vulnerability of a firm to its rival’s
defection). The Appendix of this chapter and the general Appendix (Appendix
A) provide an additional contribution in the field of Econometrics. The exper-
iment required subjects, playing the role of firms, to choose (make an output
decision) integer quantities within a bounded range. Thus, when testing for the
influence of personality variables on the quantities chosen by the subjects, the
dependent variable is not a continuous variable but rather a discrete one. An
econometric issue is whether hypothesis tests (in particular, a single-hypothesis
test (t-test), and a joint-hypotheses test (F-test)) yield exact results in the case
of a discrete dependent variable. Appendix A presents a bootstrap application,
similar to Herwartz & Xu (2009), that could be applied in case the tests are
shown to be inexact. Nevertheless, using our data we find that hypothesis tests
yield exact results.
Chapter 2 presents a standard (fixed-matching) Cournot Triopoly experiment
with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students and Malaysian
managers. This study replicates the design of Huck et al. (2004) in order to
investigate one aspect of external validity, which is whether the use of student
subjects instead of managers is justified.
The next study, included in chapter 3 of the thesis is in the field of environ-
mental economics. This study deals with the issue of optimal policy incentives to
adopt advanced technology. The motivation to this study dates back to Kneese
& Schultze (1975), which were the first to emphasize that, among all available
criteria to judge the efficiency of the different pollution control policies, one of the
most important is the extent to which a given policy encourages firms to develop
or adopt advanced technologies. Regarding the last statement, there is a distinc-
tion in the literature between models of technology innovation, i.e. development
5
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of new technology, and models of technology diffusion, i.e. adoption of new but
yet existing technology (see the reviews by Jaffe et al., 2002 and Requate, 2005).
Our study centers on the last case. Downing & White (1986), Malueg (1989) and
Milliman & Prince (1989) made the first attempts to rank environmental policy
instruments taking the adoption of advanced technologies as an efficiency crite-
rion. These studies, however, focus on the effect of the adoption of new technology
on the whole industry, and not on the incentives of a single firm to adopt the new
technology, using the aggregate cost saving as investment criteria. Consequently,
Kennedy & Laplante (2000), and Requate & Unhold (2001, 2003) (for the case
of adoption of new technology), and Montero (2002a,b) and Fischer et al. (2003)
(for the case of technology innovation) suggested that equilibrium considerations
should be taken into account when studying the incentives to adopt (or develop)
new technology, that is, the number of firms that adopt (develop) the new tech-
nology in equilibrium should be endogenously determined. Moreover, Requate
and Unold show that for both, a completely symmetric model (see Requate &
Unhold, 2003), and an asymmetric model (see Requate & Unhold, 2001), the so-
cially optimal allocation can theoretically be implemented, by issuing the ex-ante
socially optimal number of emission permits.
Chapter 3 presents an experimental investigation in the laboratory of the case
described in Requate & Unhold (2001) where firms are small and asymmetric and
when the regulator takes into account the potential technological change when
deciding on the environmental policy to be applied. This study is particularly
interesting because it is among the few experimental studies which consider dy-
namic efficiency when evaluating environmental policy. We consider a market
with 18 firms of five types (the types are characterized by their abatement cost
functions). All firms could adopt one advanced technology for a fixed payment.
We then investigate the firms’ behavior, depending on whether or not they have
received an initial allocation of permits (auctioning vs. grandfathering), and de-
pending on the specific auction design. Typically, under a system of grandfather-
ing, firms can bilaterally trade permits. To mimic this it is natural to implement
a single unit double (oral) auction. Under the so called auctioning-system of per-
mits, several designs are possible. We chose an ascending clock auction because
of its simplicity. By doing so, two features are different between the treatments:
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The allocation mechanism and the auction design. Therefore, we conducted an
additional treatment where permits are initially allocated for free, but the price is
determined by an ascending clock auction. Thus, only one feature is different be-
tween this new treatment and each of the other two treatments. Furthermore, we
conducted two types of treatments, the single-period and the multi-period treat-
ments. The single-period treatments consist of two phases: In the first phase
subjects decide whether or not to invest and in the second phase they participate
in an auction. This auction will determine their number of permits, and, thus,
their emission level (=abatement level). In the real world, however, investment
does not always happen simultaneously. Firms might first wait and observe the
other firms’ behavior, and only then decide whether to invest in the new technol-
ogy. In this sense, we conducted further series of treatments where the relevant
time horizon is four periods. As in the single-period treatments each period con-
sists of two phases: In the first phase subjects decide whether or not to invest
(only if they did not invest in the previous periods), and in the second phase
they participate in an auction. We refer to these treatments as the multi-period
treatments. We are interested in possible deviations from (i) the optimal invest-
ment in advanced abatement technology, (ii) the efficient allocations of permits
(reflected in the total abatement costs given the investment decision), and (iii)
the optimal total social welfare in the economy. In addition, we employ the low-
payoff menu of paired lottery (Holt & Laury, 2002) to learn whether subjects’
attitudes towards risk affect their performance in the laboratory.
So far, the studies included in this thesis are laboratory experiments in the
field of industrial organization. In these studies subjects play the role of firms
operating in markets which are defined by the experimenters. The last chapter
of this thesis, chapter 4, presents a natural field experiment which was influenced
by the literature on bargaining experiments5 and in particular by the ultimatum
bargaining game (UG).6 This experiment was conducted in the main train station
of Kiel, Germany.
5Roth (1995) provides an excellent review on bargaining experiments.
6The ultimatum bargaining game is a sequential game where Player A divides a pie of size
x between himself and another Player B. Player B, then, decides whether to accept and receive




Since it was introduced by Gu¨th et al. (1982), the UG serves as a prominent
and consistent example of a situation where the observed behavior deviates signif-
icantly from the game theoretical prediction. There is, however, criticism whether
UG indeed describes a real world phenomenon (see Grace & Kemp, 2005, p.824).
This motivates the search for real-world situations having an UG structure. The
introduction of the Schleswig-Holstein ticket (S-H ticket), by the German train
company (Deutsche Bahn) created a market for budget travel by train. The S-H
ticket allows up to five people to travel together for a fixed price in regional trains
within two federal states in northern Germany for nearly an entire day. Due to
the feature that only a single passenger who rides with the S-H ticket can continue
using it after separating from the others, it is worthwhile for some passengers (for
instance, passengers who need to use the ticket later) to buy the S-H ticket and
offer to take others with their ticket for a specified price. Thus, this market is
characterized, not by spontaneous gatherings of passengers who want to share the
cost of traveling, as one could expect, but rather by ‘proposers’ who offer to take
‘responders’ with their ticket. A deadline imposed by the trains’ departure time
on the bargainers transforms the situation into an ultimatum situation. Thus,
by investigating this market we could learn about the behavior of proposers and
responders in a situation restricted by a deadline. Chapter 4 thoroughly describes
this market, which we refer to as the Kiel market for budget travel by train. In
particular, we start by characterizing and describing the empirical features of the
market. In this part, we center our analysis on the proposers’ behavior (especially
we analyze whether proposers offer to take responders for a price that maximizes
their revenue). We continue by describing the ‘ride-share community’, a popular
market for budget travel by car in Germany and compare it to the Kiel market
for cheap train ride. Finally, we investigate the responders’ behavior in the Kiel
market for budget travel by train by entering the market as proposers.
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Chapter 1
On The Role of Personality
Traits in Oligopoly Experiments
1.1 Introduction
A major controversy in psychology is whether the behavior of (economic) agents
is mainly determined by the agent’s personality or by the specific situation in
which he is operating.1 Economists have largely ignored this debate since they
believe that the situation is the main determinant of behavior. In fact, the theory
of induced value (Smith, 1976) aims at reducing the role of subjective values (or
innate characteristics) associated with market decisions.
Two sources of evidence motivate the examination of personality characteris-
tics when modeling strategic interactions among firms (or firms’ managers): First,
studies in organizational psychology provide evidence for a correlation between
certain personality traits and managerial success (e.g. Harrell & Alpert, 1989;
Judge et al., 1999). Second, following Shackleton & Newell (1997), 64% of the
big companies in the UK and about 33% of those in the US use personality mea-
sures in the selection of managers. This evidence suggests that personality traits
may be responsible for managerial success.
Although the role of certain personality traits in explaining behavior has al-
ready been tested in a prisoners’ dilemma game (PD), a game with only two pure
1Mechelen & Raad (1999) provide a short review on this controversy.
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strategies, and in a few other economic experiments, we believe that testing the
role of personality traits is in particular worth to be pursued in market compe-
tition games with many different possible actions and strategies. Especially the
seminal quantity-setting Oligopoly game (Cournot competition) offers a rich and
differentiated test bed for investigating the relationship between personality traits
and behavior in a potentially competitive situation. Such a test is particularly
interesting under a random matching treatment since a long-term relationship
with one partner cannot be established.
In this paper we report results from a two-stage experiment aiming to test
whether personality, as reflected by the Five Factor Model (FFM), affects behav-
ior in a Cournot Duopoly. In the first stage, the subjects had to fill in the NEO
Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R), and in the second step, about one
month later, a subsample of these subjects participated in a Cournot Duopoly
experiment with random matching. Our design draws largely on the ‘easy’ treat-
ment by Bosch-Dome´nech & Vriend (2003). We chose, however, a larger ratio
between collusive and Cournot profits than was used in the previous random
matching experiments (Huck et al., 2001 and Holt, 1986).2
The FFM was originated from the lexical approach, following the idea that
the most important personality traits are encoded within the natural language.3
The mappings of the language in search for the basic dimensions of personality
(using factor-analysis to organize personality term into few general categories)
have brought to a growing recognition among psychologists that personality can
be described by five dimensions (see Digman, 1990). These dimensions are num-
bered and labeled as follows:4 I. Extraversion (or Surgency) II. Agreeableness
III. Conscientiousness (or Will) IV. Neuroticism (or Emotional Stability) V. In-
tellect (or Openness to experience). The NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) is
a predominant5 self-report inventory based on factor analysis which was specifi-
cally designed to measure the FFM, as such, it provides a general description of a
2In contrast to earlier studies using collusion/Nash-equilibrium profit ratio of 1.125 (Huck
et al., 2001) and 1.05 in (Holt, 1986), we chose this ratio to be 1.5.
3See John et al., 1988, for an excellent review on the lexical approach.
4Although there is a broad recognition about the five dimensions there is some debate about
the names (and specific definitions) of these dimensions.
5According to John & Srivastava (1999) it is the best-validated Big Five measures in the
questionnaire tradition.
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normal personality of adults and adolescents. The NEO-PI-R has some very plau-
sible features, among them its high validity6, it has been widely used in various
situations (e.g. clinical settings, business and industries counseling, psychological
and educational research), and in various countries and cultures.
The main finding of this paper is that in the first period of the experiment col-
lusive behavior is significantly correlated with high conscientiousness and female
sex. There is, however, even in the first period no significant correlation between
performance and any of the other four personality domains, especially not with
those traits we would expect to find a correlation, such as agreeableness. In the
final periods, when subjects have gained experience, we find that, in line with
economic theory, their performance is largely independent of personality traits.
Finally we establish that the relatively high ratio between collusive and com-
petitive profits, as was chosen in our experiment, does not induce more collusion
than in previous experiments. Rather, the Nash equilibrium is still the best
predictor, at least in this random-matching Cournot Duopoly game.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we briefly review the literature
investigating the role of personality traits in other economic experiments. In
section 1.3 we portray the experimental design. In section 1.4 we present our
results, and in section 1.5 we draw our conclusions.
1.2 The Effect of Personality in Economics Ex-
periments
1.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments
The role of personality traits in PD experiments has been investigated much
before experimental economics started to boom. An extended survey of this
literature is given by Rubin & Brown (1975, p.174-196). Harnett et al. (1968)
find that risk-taking propensity (defined as a general willingness to take risks in
6Regarding the German version: Internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) for
the domain scales range from .87 to .92. Stability coefficients (test-retest reliability) for the
domain scales ranging from .91 to .84 have been found in one-moth and six-month longitudinal
studies.
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social situations), is negatively correlated with cooperative behavior, while Pilisuk
et al. (1965) show that tolerance of ambiguity and opened-mindedness (defined
as the tendency of individuals to prefer chance to regularity, ambiguity to clarity,
etc.) are positively correlated with cooperation in PD-experiments. Moreover,
according to Boone et al. (1999), sensation seeking (defined as an individual’s
motivation to experience) is also positively correlated with cooperation.
Lindskold (1971); Tedeschi et al. (1969a); Williams et al. (1969), and Faucheux
& Moscovici (1968) find that low self-concept and high anxiety are positively
correlated with competitive behavior.7 Self-concept describes the set of beliefs
that a person has about how he looks in his own eyes and in the eyes of others.
A person with low self-concept has low self-esteem and high anxiety. Subjects’
predisposition to trust others is positively correlated with cooperative behavior
(Schlenker et al., 1973; Tedeschi et al., 1969b; Wrightsman, 1966). Factor G
in Cattel and Eber’s 16PF self-report inventory which reflects morality, charity
and dutifulness, is positively correlated with cooperation (Gillis & Woods, 1971).
Machiavellianism defined by Christie & Geis (1970) as the willingness to use
opportunistic behavior in interpersonal relationship, is negatively correlated with
cooperation (Uejio & Wrightsman, 1967; Wahlin, 1967).
Rotter (1966) defines the so called locus of control measuring the subjective
perception whether some outcome is the result of a person’s self-effort. Within
this concept there is a distinction between internals and externals: Internals
believe that the outcome of a situation is determined by their own actions, while
externals believe that it is determined mainly by external forces such as ‘luck’
and ‘fate’. Bobbit (1967) finds that internals are more maximizers than externals,
and that they are less sensitive to variations in the other’s behavior, while Boone
et al. (1999) find that internals are more cooperative than externals. The latter
result is related to our findings since Rotter’s locus of control is correlated with
consciousness, the only trait that significantly ‘explains’ performance in the first
period of our quantity setting game. Boone et al. (1999) also find that high
self-monitoring is positively correlated with cooperation.8
7Rubin & Brown (1975, p.178) report that one study finds negative correlation between
high self-concept and cooperative behavior.
8Self-monitoring is a measure of how much an individual’s behavior is influenced by his
surroundings (a high self-monitoring individual observes and controls his or her behavior while
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1.2.2 Other economic experiments
The effect of personality traits on behavior was also tested in other economic ex-
periments. In a variant of the bilateral monopoly game, Harnett et al. (1968) find
that risk-taking propensity is correlated with competitive behavior. For the same
game Hughes et al. (1973) find that internals (w.r.t. Rotter’s locus of control)
cooperate more than externals. Within a two-person one-shot constituent game
(a game in which the first participant choose whether to trust or to distrust the
second participant, and the second participant choose whether to reciprocate or
defect), Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) find Machiavellianism to be negatively cor-
related with cooperative behavior. Perugini et al. (2008, forthcoming) report that
agreeableness and honesty (domains in the Big Six measure by Lee & Ashton,
2005) are correlated with positive donation in a public good experiment. Similar
to our findings this effect of personality vanishes with experience (in a second
period of the experiment) and is larger for males than for females. Ben-Ner et al.
(2004) find that high agreeableness and low extraversion are positively correlated
with positive donation in a dictator game. Kurzban & Houser (2001) find that
high self-esteem (and female gender) is positively correlated with being a free-rider
in a circular public goods game. Fahr & Irlenbusch (2008) report that low anxiety
is positively correlated with trustful behavior, in a trust game. Bra¨ndstatter &
Ko¨nigstein (2001) find that high score on independence and tough-mindedness,
demand more than others when they are assigned the role of proposers in an
ultimatum game. They also find that ‘reciprocity oriented’ subjects (either emo-
tionally stable and introverted, or emotionally unstable and extroverted) reject
proposals more than others. Finally, Bu¨chner et al. (2007) find that the interper-
sonal interactivity index, which is a measure of personality characteristics related
to pro-social behavior, does not predict behavior in a solidarity game.
a low self-monitoring individual behaves according to his desires).
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1.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We set up a symmetric Cournot Duopoly experiment with a homogeneous product
and random matching lasting over 20 periods. Communication between the firms
(subjects) is not allowed; the feedback after each period contains information
about the firm and the other firm’s performance. The firms are acting in a
market with the following demand function:
P (Q) = max {480− 4Q, 0} , (1.1)
where Q = q1 + q2. Additionally, each seller bears a fixed cost of 4800. Subjects
could select integer quantities between 29 and 48. Under this setting, the indi-
vidual best response (Cournot-Nash) quantity is qN = 40, whereas the collusive
quantity is given by qM = 30, and the rivalistic quantity by qR = 48.9 We do not
expect to observe only the three benchmark quantities in the experiment. There-
fore, following Fouraker & Siegel (1963), we divide the set of possible actions
into three ranges associated with the three types of strategies.10 The theoretical
predictions are given in Table 1.1.
Cournot-Nash Cooperative Rivalistic
Individual quantities qNi = 40 q
M
i = 30 q
R
i = 48
(range) {35, ..., 44} {29, ..., 35} {44, ..., 48}
Market quantities QNi = 80 Q
M
i = 60 Q
R
i = 96
(range) {70, ..., 88} {58, ..., 70} {88, ..., 96}
Profit ΠNi = 1600 Π
M
i = 2400 Π
R
i = −192
Table 1.1: Theoretical predictions
Out of the total sample of 102 undergraduate students, from different de-
partments that completed the German version of the NEO-PI-R (Ostendorf &
Angleitner, 2004), we randomly selected 36 subjects to participate in a Cournot
Duopoly experiment.11 The experiment was conducted at the University of Kiel,
9In our design the rivalistic action was at the corner of the set of feasible actions, it is defined
as qRi =qi [Πi(q)−Πj(q); 0 ≤ qi ≤ 48], the other two strategies were defined as in Fouraker &
Siegel (1963).
10A “border” quantity such as 35 is defined as being half cooperative and half Cournot.
11The average age of the subjects was 21.04 years, exactly 50% of the subjects were females.
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using the z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects were
equipped with a profit table that summarizes all possible outcomes of the game.
Two (randomly-chosen) periods were taken into account for the total profit. All
the entries in the profit table are expressed in Experimental Currency Units
(ECU). As an exchange rate we chose 400:1 (ECU/Euro).
1.4 Experimental Results
We start by describing aggregate outcome in the Duopoly markets, and then we
examine the impact of the increased cooperation ratio on the individual firm’s
behavior. Finally, we test the effect of personality traits on subject’s performance.
1.4.1 Aggregate behavior
Figure 1.1 describes the evolution of the mean market quantity over time. We
see that the average quantity is in the Cournot-Nash range in all periods. Figure
1.2 presents the histograms of the pooled quantities (across 18 markets and over
20 periods). From this figure we can see that most quantities selected by the
subjects are classified as either Cournot or rivalistic. More precisely, 74% of the
quantities selected by the subjects were inside the Cournot range while 24% and
1% were in the rivalistic and cooperative ranges, respectively. The mean quantity
is equal to 83.7 (using a t-test, we reject the null hypothesis of mean quantity
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Figure 1.1: Average market quantity over time (the middle graph). The upper
(lower) graph denotes the mean quantity plus (minus) one standard deviation.
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Figure 1.2: Histogram of the pooled quantities across markets and over time. The




As subjects gain experience during experiments, their behavior often converges.
This implies that experience and thus the situation rather than the personality
mainly determines behavior. To elicit the impact of personality in the absence
of experience we dispensed with trial periods in order to test whether and which
personality characteristics influence behavior at the beginning of the experiment
and after experience has been gained.12 The histograms in Figure 1.3 show the
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Figure 1.3: The histograms of the quantities chosen in period 1 (left) and in
period 19. The dashed lines denote the three benchmark quantities (qM = 30,
qN = 40, qR = 48).
From Figure 1.3 we see that in the first period 19% of the subjects chose a
quantity inside the cooperative range of strategies, while in the 19th period only
1% of the subjects chose to cooperate (in fact, already in the second period, only
5% of the quantities are assigned to the cooperation range). Using a Wilcoxon
Sign Rank test we formally reject the hypothesis that the outcome of the first
period is equal to the outcome of the 19th period at the 1% s.l, finding that the
first period yields a significantly higher level of cooperation than the 19th period.
Previous random-matching Duopoly experiments (Holt, 1986; Huck et al.,
2001) show that the Nash strategy is the best predictor in a random matching
12Nevertheless, in order to minimize the risk of subjects not understanding the environment,
they had to do a simple test to establish whether they know how to use the profit table.
13Following Fouraker & Siegel (1963) and Huck et al. (2001), we chose the second but last
period instead of the last period to eliminate end round effects.
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Cournot Duopoly. However, in those experiments the ratio of cooperative profit
to Nash profit, ranging between 1.125 in Huck et al. (2001) and 1.05 in Holt
(1986), was relatively small. In our experiment we chose a ratio of 1.5. This,
however, implies that the cooperator is more vulnerable. We therefore define the
vulnerability ratio as the ratio between the Nash profit and the profit a player
receives when choosing the cooperative action while the other player deviates. In
our setting, this ratio is equal to 1600/600 = 2.66, which is significantly larger
than in previous studies (1.02-1.11 in Holt, 1986 and 1.18 in Huck et al., 2001).
Since we are not able to explicitly test for differences between experiments con-
ducted under different settings and procedures, we pursue a qualitative approach
by comparing the frequencies of the corresponding strategy ranges (Cournot-
Nash, cooperative, and rivalistic) in the first period, in the second-last period,
and the total quantities over all time periods of our study to those in Huck et al.
(2001)14 and Holt (1986)15. The results of the individual (firm) level classifica-
tions are shown in Table 1.2.
Study (year), period % Cournot-Nash % Cooperative % Rivalistic
Our (07), 1st 73.6 12.5 13.8
Our (07), 9th 66.6 5.5 27.7
Our (07), 19th 68.0 0 31.9
Our (07), Total 61.3 4.7 33.9
Huck et al. (01), 1st - - -
Huck et al. (01), 9th 75.0 20.0 5.0
Huck et al. (01), Total 63.5 24.2 12.2
Holt (86) , 1st 54.1 33.3 12.5
Holt (86), 9th 95.8 4.1 0.0
Holt (86), Total 85.8 10.8 3.3
Table 1.2: A comparison of strategy frequencies in the first period, in the second-
last period, and of the total quantities (in bold print) over all time periods of the
different studies.
Using a Chi-square test we find that the observed frequencies in our study
differ significantly from those observed in previous experiments (Huck et al., 2001
14Huck et al. (01): cooperative space: 3-7, Cournot space: 7-10, rivalistic space: 10-15.
15Holt (86): cooperative space: 4-7, Cournot space: 7-10, rivalistic space: 10-22.
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and Holt, 1986).16 Nonetheless, we still find that most quantities selected by the
subjects in our study are in the Cournot range.
1.4.3 The effect of personality traits
While economic theory does not provide us with an explanation for the difference
in behavior across subjects, personality traits may account for that. Thus, we test
whether the domains of the NEO-PI-R (for the definitions of the five domains
see Table 1.6) could explain subjects’ behavior. Besides testing the effect of
personality we also control for gender.
Mason & Phillips (1991) find that women tend to cooperate more than men
in the first periods of a Cournot Duopoly experiment (though under fixed match-
ing). Therefore we expect a similar result in our experiment.17 From other
previous studies we hypothesize that high agreeableness (which is associated
with traits such as trust, altruism and compliance), high extraversion (which
is associated with excitement seeking), high openness (which is associated with
open-mindedness), high conscientiousness (which is associated with traits such
as competence and dutifulness, thus with internalism according to Rotter’s locus
of control), and low neuroticism (which is associated with traits such as anxiety
and self-consciousness) will be positively correlated with collusion in our Cournot
experiment.
For the purpose of evaluating the overall effect of personality traits on behavior
we estimate a random effect panel data model.18 Beside the five personality
domains and a dummy for gender, and in order to account for the interactions
between the firms current decision and their experience during the experiment,
16The frequencies observed for the total quantities are different between each pair of studies
at the 1% s.l.
17Numerous PD and other bargaining experiments were investigating the role of gender on
performance. However, these studies came up with ambiguous evidence (see Rubin & Brown,
1975, p.169-174 for a survey of more than hundred studies).
18The model takes the following specification
qi,t = α+ β1qj,t−1 + β2qj,t−2 +X ′iγ + µi + νi,t, (1.2)
where Xi is a matrix collecting the personality variables and a dummy for gender, γ is a vector
of parameters to be estimated, µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ), and νi,t ∼ IID(0, σ2ν)
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we also include the lagged quantities of the other firm in the market (qj,t−1, and
qj,t−2) among the explanatory variables.
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
Lagged (1) rival’s quantity 0.13*** 0.03
Lagged(2) rival’s quantity 0.09*** 0.03
(N) Neuroticism 0.00 0.02
(E) Extraversion -0.02 0.02
(O) Openness -0.00 0.02
(A) Agreeableness -0.02 0.02






Observation =648; Wald χ2(9) = 32.25***; B-P χ2(1) = 27.82***
R2 within=0.03; between=0.13; overall=0.06
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Table 1.3: Random effect estimation
Table 1.3 shows that, averaging over all periods, personality does not influence
the behavior of subjects in our random-matching Duopoly. It also illustrates
that after subjects have gained experience, their behavior depends also on their
experience with the other firm in the market (though this effect is rather weak as
indicated by the R2). To test the effect of personality in the absence of experience,
and alternatively, after the subjects have gained enough experience, we estimate,
via OLS, two models aiming at explaining the selected quantities in periods 1
and 19 using the five domains of the NEO-PI-R and gender.
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Variable Coef. Std. Err.
(N) Neuroticism 0.00 0.04
(E) Extraversion 0.02 0.04
(O) Openness -0.05 0.03
(A) Agreeableness -0.03 0.04




Observation =36 R2=0.35 Adj-R2=0.22
(a) Dep. variable: quantities in period 1
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
(N) Neuroticism -0.04 0.03
(E) Extraversion 0.01 0.03
(O) Openness 0.03 0.03
(A) Agreeableness -0.06 0.03




Observation =36 R2=0.21 Adj-R2=0.04
(b) Dep. variable: quantities in period 19
Table 1.4: OLS estimations with the NEO-PI-R domains as explanatory variables:
In Table 1.4(a) the dependent variable is the quantity selected in period 1. In
Table 1.4(b) the dependent variable is the quantity selected in period 19. *, **,
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
From Table 1.4 we find that high conscientiousness and gender affect cooper-
ation in the first period but not after the subjects have gained enough experience
(period 19).19 More precisely, both high conscientiousness and female sex are
positively correlated with collusive behavior. We do not, however, observe any
significant effect of the other personality domains. It is in particular surprising
that agreeableness, associated with traits such as trust, altruism, and compliance,
and thus apparently being related to cooperation, is not correlated with subjects’
19As in the public good experiment by Perugini et al. (2008, forthcoming), we find that the
effect of personality vanishes already in the second period.
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performance, even in the first period.
1.5 Discussion
A major objective of this study was to test whether it is justified to ignore per-
sonality traits of subjects playing the role of firms in laboratory experiments. In
fact, not only economists but also many psychologists believe that the power of
personality measures in explaining individual behavior is rather limited (see, for
instance, Mischel, 1969). Performing a Cournot Duopoly experiment with ran-
dom matching, we find that in the absence of experience (i.e. in the first period
of a treatment), personality as measured by the NEO-PI-R and gender have some
effect on the subjects’ behavior. After subjects have gained experience, however,
their behavior is largely independent of their personality traits.
In particular we find that, in the first period, high conscientiousness and fe-
male sex are correlated with collusive actions. This finding is interesting because
it confirms that behavior in the laboratory may be affected by personality char-
acteristics that are not directly related to the original research hypothesis (the
agreeableness domain, associated with traits such as trust, altruism, and compli-
ance seems ex-ante more directly related to cooperation).
Finally, we find that a larger cooperation ratio does not yield more cooperation
than in previous studies. This finding may be due to the fact that the higher gain
from cooperation is offset by a higher degree of vulnerability. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to control for these issues separately, since a larger cooperation
ratio automatically induces higher vulnerability. Overall, in line with previous
studies, we find that the most frequent strategy chosen by the subjects is close to
the Cournot strategy but, surprisingly enough, deviations from the Cournot-Nash
prediction go more frequently into the direction of more competition rather than
to collusion.
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1.6.1 Translated instructions and the profit table
General Introduction
• Welcome to our experiment. Please read the instructions carefully! From
now on until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to communicate
with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand
and we will answer your question individually.
• In this experiment you can earn a reasonable amount of money depending
on your decision and also on the decisions of the others. The profit you
earn in the experiment will be paid at the end of the experiment in such a
way that you will not see how much the others have earned, nor will they
see how much you have earned.
• You play the role of a firm selling a good in a market. Each market consists
of only two firms: your firm (Firm A) and another firm (Firm B), which is
identical to yours.
• At the beginning of each period we will randomly assign who will be the
other firm (Firm B) in the market. However, you will never learn about the
identity of the persons participating with you in the market, and they will
never learn about your identity (neither during nor after the experiment).
• The experiment consists of exactly 20 periods.
Experimental Procedure:
• In each period, each firm makes one decision: the quantity of the good to be
sold in the market. Only integer values between 29 and 48 can be chosen.
• Your decision and the decision of the other firm in the market (firm B) are
made simultaneously.
• The profit depends on the total quantity produced by the market (which
includes yours and the other firm quantity).
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• You will be given a profit table showing the profit levels (or losses) that
you (firm A) and the other firm’s (firm B) can obtain by choosing certain
quantities. The quantities of your firm (firm A) are listed across the top
of the table while the quantities produced by the other firm (firm B) are
listed down on the left-hand margin. The profit for your firm and the other
firm are given in the body of the table by the intersection of the quantities
produced. The top number in bold print denotes your profit (firm’s A
profit) and the bottom number denotes the profit of the other firm.
• After each period you will obtain information on your screen about the
quantity chosen by you, the quantity chosen by the other firm, the profit
you earned from this period, and the other firm’s profit from this period.
• After each period you will also see the history of your market (your quantity,
your profit, the other firm’s quantity, and the other firm’s profit).
• At your work place you will find an empty sheet of paper for your own use.
Payment:
• Each participant gets a ‘show-up’ fee of 2e for participating in the experi-
ment (losses will not be subtracted from this show-up fee).
• All payoffs are in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), 400 ECU equals 1e.
• At the end of experiment, one of the participants will toss a 20-sided dice.
This will be done twice (or until two different periods have been chosen).
The total profit from the experiment will be the sum of the profits from the
two periods selected accordingly. This will be done in front of you.
• The total profit to be earned in the experiment is the fixed amount of 6e
from filling in the questionnaire, plus the ‘show-up’ fee of 2e, plus the total
amount earned in two randomly chosen periods.
• At the end of the experiment we will add up your profits and calculate your
reward. This will be done in such a way that others will not see how much
you have earned, nor will you see how much they have earned. You will get
your money immediately in cash.
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To be sure that you understand how to use the profit table, please
check the following example:
Look at the profit table. If you choose the quantity of 31 and the
other firm chooses the quantity of 36, your profit will be 1772 ECU
and the other firm’s profit will be 2832 ECU.
Fill in the profits in the following statement:
When you choose the quantity of 48 and the other firm chooses the
quantity of 45, your profit will be
and the other firm’s profit will be .
26
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1.6.2 NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R)
Domain Name Definition
Neuroticism A general tendency to experience negative affects such as fear, sadness,
embarrassment, anger, guilt and disgust. Men and woman high
on N are also prone to irrational ideas, to be less able to control
their impulses, and they cope more poorly than others with stress
Extraversion Extraverts (high E) are sociable, they like people and prefer large
groups. They like excitement and stimulation, and tend to be cheerful.
They are also upbeat, energetic and optimistic. Introversion should
be seen as the absence of extraversion, rather than as its opposite
Openness Openness to experience (high O) means active imagination, aesthetic,
sensitivity attentiveness to inner feelings, preference for variety,
intellectual curiosity and openness to different value systems. Low scores
on O tend to be conventional in behavior and conservative in outlook
Agreeableness The agreeableness person (high A) is fundamentally altruistic. He or she is
sympathetic to others, eager to help them, and believe that they will be
equally helpful in return. Disagreeable (antagonistic) person is egocentric,
skeptical of the intentions of others, and competitive rather than cooperative.
Conscientiousness The conscientiousness individual is purposeful, strong-willed and
determined, This trait can be also referred as ‘will to achieve’. High C
are scrupulous punctual and reliable. Low scores are not lacking of
moral principles but they are less exciting in applying them.
The descriptions are based on Costa & McCrae (2006, Chapter 5).
Table 1.6: The five domains of the NEO-PI-R
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Table 1.7: NEO-PI-R Domains and Facets
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1.6.3 Screens
Figure 1.4: The random-matching Cournot duopoly experiment: The ‘decision
screen’ in each period.
30
1.6 Appendix to Chapter 1
Figure 1.5: The random-matching Cournot duopoly experiment: The ‘results
screen’ after each period. The results of the previous periods are displayed in the
bottom of the screen.
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1.6.4 The size features of hypothesis tests
Ideally, a statistical test should be exact. This means that the probability of re-
jecting the null hypothesis when it is true should be exactly equal to the nominal
significance level of the test. However, because of the discreteness of our depen-
dent variable there is a need to verify the size features of the hypothesis tests in
use.20
Consider a representative linear regression model:
yi = xi1β1 + xi2β2 + ...+ xikβk + i
or in matrix form:
y = Xβ +  (1.3)
where y is the N -dimensional vector of integer quantities ranging between 29
to 48. X is an (N × k) dimensional matrix collecting the explanatory variables
(including constant), β = (β0...βk)
′ is a k-dimensional vector of parameters, and
 is the error term vector.
It can be shown (see, for example, Greene, 2003, p.51) that if the error term,
, is normally distributed, hypothesis testing of a single coefficient (under the null




, j = 1, ..., k (1.4)
where sβˆj is the standard error of βj. This statistic is student-t distributed with
N − k degrees of freedom.
A joint significance test of the coefficients in the model (without including the
constant) is done using the following F statistics (Greene, 2003, p.97):
20The bootstrap approach recently suggested by Herwartz & Xu (2009) could correct for
inexact result if needed.
32
1.6 Appendix to Chapter 1
F = (Rβˆ − q)′{R[s2(X′X)−1]R′}−1(Rβˆ − q)/J (1.5)
where J is the number of restrictions, R is a (J × k) matrix with ones on the
diagonal start from the second column of the first raw and otherwise zeros21. q
is a (1× J) vector of zeros. The above statistic follows an F distribution with J ,
N − k degrees of freedom.
Due to the discreteness of our dependent variable we could not assume that
the error term in (1.3) is normally distributed, thus we had to verify the size
features of the hypothesis tests in use. For this purpose we generated data with
similar characteristics to ours, however, we deteriorated the connection between
the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. In other words, we gen-
erated data under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the dependent
variable and the independent variables. Hence, we could investigate the rejection







(M < N = 36) were drawn randomly with re-
placement from {xij}Ni=1 (j = 1, ..., k). Note that N is the total number of
observation (see Table 1.4). Additionally, we used the values M = 30 and
M = 20.22
2. M observations {y∗i }Mi=1 were drawn randomly with replacement from {yi}Ni=1,
3. We determined the OLS estimators βˆ∗j , and computed the t and the F






. Then we compared these statistics with
the corresponding Student-t and the F critical values. The null hypothesis
is rejected when the |t| or the F statistics exceed the 1 − α/2 and 1 − α
quantiles of the Student-t and F distribution, respectively.
21The specific structure of the R matrix aims to test the joint-hypothesis of the model, we
exclude the constant since its correlation with the dependent variable is not testable.
22The results for M=20 are virtually the same as for M=30, they can be received from the
author upon request.
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were fixed along the procedure). The size estimates are the total number of
rejections divided by the 10000 simulations. Table 1.8 presents the size estimates
of hypothesis tests (t-tests which measure the significance of each of the five
personality domains and gender in explaining performance, and an F-test which
measures the joint-significance of all these variables).
Nominal significance level Nominal significance level
10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
Variable D. Variable: Period 1 D. Variable: Period 19
(N) Neuroticism 10.02 5.26 1.01 10.44 5.30 1.18
(E) Extraversion 10.00 5.05 1.10 10.56 5.17 1.04
(O) Openness 10.20 4.84 0.99 10.20 5.05 1.06
(A) Agreeableness 10.39 5.19 1.22 10.52 5.07 1.08
(C) Conscientiousness 9.91 5.01 1.00 10.01 5.07 1.14
Gender 9.48 4.83 0.89 10.03 5.01 1.05
F-test (6, 23) 9.88 5.07 1.10 10.57 5.67 1.26
Table 1.8: Empirical size estimates for hypothesis tests (according to Table 1.4)
in percentage points, for alternative nominal significant levels, α = 10%, 5%, 1%,
M = 30, 10000 simulations
Table 1.8 illustrates that empirical size estimates are close to the nominal level




Managers and Students Playing
Cournot - Experimental Evidence
from Malaysia
2.1 Introduction
Laboratory experiments in industrial organization are often criticized for using
students as subjects. The criticism centers on the issue of whether a sample of
students can deliver information about the behavior of firms (or firms’ managers).
As a consequence, several experiments were designed to test the effect of subject
pool selection on subject performance. These experiments came up with ambigu-
ous evidence. While Cooper et al. (1999), Montmarquette et al. (2004), and Ball
& Cech (1996) find little or no difference in performance between managers and
students, Fehr & List (2004), Alp´ızar et al. (2004), and Cooper (2006) find that
in particular situations managers behave more cooperatively than students.
The classical quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly is a prominent example of
strategic interaction among firms. Due to its simplicity, it is the subject of nu-
merous experimental studies. Despite the focus on firms’ behavior, the external
validity of Cournot experiments conducted with students has never been chal-
lenged by conducting similar experiments with managers.
Huck et al. (2004) designed a series of experiments that comprise the common
features of most Cournot studies. Using student subjects they find that although
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participants in a duopoly sometimes collude, this rarely occurs in the market with
more than two firms. In addition, they find that the Nash equilibrium is a quite
accurate predictor for subject performance in a Cournot triopoly.
Since the experimental evidence by Fehr & List (2004), Alp´ızar et al. (2004),
and Cooper (2006) suggests that managers show more collusive behavior than
students, we replicate the design of Huck et al. (2004) in order to test whether
the use of student subjects instead of managers in a Cournot triopoly experiment
is sensible with regard to external validity. In particular, this study compares the
performance of middle and high-ranking Malaysian managers mainly from the
manufacturing industry with Malaysian and German undergraduate students.
Our findings support those studies suggesting that managers perform more
cooperatively than students. We also find that the country matters (i.e. Ger-
man students perform more cooperatively than Malaysian students), while gender
affects the outcome differently in Germany and Malaysia.
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedure
We adopt the design of Huck et al. (2004) for the triopoly case, but we use differ-
ent subject populations: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian
managers.
2.2.1 The underlying model and design
In particular, we set up a symmetric Cournot triopoly1 with a homogeneous
product and fixed matching lasting over 25 periods. Communication between
the firms (subjects) is not allowed; the feedback after each period contains only
aggregate information about the other firms’ performance.
The firms are acting in a market with the following demand function:
P (Q) = max {100−Q, 0} , (2.1)
1As in most oligopoly experiments, the situation was economically framed.
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where Q =
∑3
i=1 qi. The cost function for each seller is
C (qi) = qi (2.2)
Under this setting, the Nash equilibrium market quantity is QN = 74.25, whereas
the symmetric collusive (monopolistic) quantity is given by QM = 49.5, and the
competitive quantity by QC = 99.
Subjects could select quantities between 1 and 100 in steps of 0.01. In each
period the subjects were allowed to use a profit calculator for simulating their
own and the other firms’ decisions before taking the real-output decision.
2.2.2 Subjects recruitment and control
We recruited 33 undergraduate students from the University of Kiel, Germany,
and 39 undergraduate students from University Sains Malaysia.2 Additionally,
we invited 33 Malaysian managers from small and medium-size firms mainly from
the manufacturing industry (plastics, cable assemblers, chip manufacturers, and
computer parts manufacturers) in Penang Island, West Malaysia, to participate in
the experiment. Target companies were sourced from the Federation of Malaysian
Manufacturers (FMM) directory, which lists all the small and medium size firms
(SME) in Penang state. A letter of invitation was sent to the company secretary
asking him/her to forward it to the relevant person in the company.3 Manager
age ranged between 29 and 54, most of them around 35. All of them had at least
a Bachelor’s degree and two of them a PhD. As they had Malaysian citizenship,
the ethnicity of the managers was Chinese (90.9%) and Indian. The estimated
earnings of the selected group ranged between 4000 RM and 9000 RM per month,
with an estimated average of 5000-6000 RM.4
The subjects participating in the three treatments had not previously partic-
ipated in an experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted using
2Most students in Germany and Malaysia were recruited from Economics courses.
3We did not reveal the nature of the experiment, merely that it was a computer-based




the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) experimental program. In all treatments we fol-
lowed the same procedure, and used the same experimenter.5 The experiment was
explained and conducted in English (in Malaysia) and German. The instructions
(based on an English translation of Huck et al., 2004) were carefully inspected
by the experimenters (one is linguistically and culturally fluent in Malaysian En-
glish, the other is in German). Regarding the currency effect, the payment was
calculated to have a similar purchasing power across countries, so that a German
student choosing the Nash equilibrium quantity along the experiment (given that
the whole industry also decides on the Nash equilibrium quantity) earns e15.
Under similar conditions, a Malaysian student earns 9.5 RM.6
2.3 Results
Following the approach of Huck et al. (2004), we start by averaging market quan-
tities over time. This approach allows us to explore the average performance of
each oligopoly market. Second, in order to figure out the time-series properties
of the data, we average market quantities at each time period. Last, we inspect
the pooled data across markets and over time.
2.3.1 The effect of subject pool on performance
German Students Malaysian Students Malaysian Managers
Q¯1−25 74.66 (5.19) 80.83 (8.85) 75.91 (4.88)
Q¯17−25 76.18 (5.79) 81.25 (6.93) 76.21 (4.94)
Q¯5−20 75.51 (5.81) 80.05 (9.16) 75.96 (5.08)
Table 2.1: Mean (and standard deviation) of the market quantities averaged over
time. Q¯1−25 is the average over all periods, Q¯17−25 is the average over the last 9
periods, Q¯5−20 is the average over the middle 16 periods.
5We followed the procedure of Roth et al. (1991) concerning the cross-country aspects.
6On the one hand, a vegetarian sandwich and a bottle of Coca-Cola cost about 3 RM at
the University Sains Malaysia campus, in comparison with about e3.5 at the University of Kiel
Campus. On the other hand, students’ earnings per hour (alternative cost) are about 3.5 RM




Table 2.1 presents the market quantities averaged over all periods, over the
last 9 periods, and over the intermediate 16 periods (periods 5 to 20, in order to
exclude beginning and end effects). Table 2.1 suggests that the averaged quantity
selected by the Malaysian students is larger than the average quantities selected
by both the Malaysian managers and the German students. Formally, using a
Flinger and Policello robust rank order test (F-P test) we find that the median
quantity selected by the Malaysian students is different from the median quantity
selected by each of the other two samples at the 5% s.l. Also, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the median quantities selected by the German students
and the Malaysian managers are not different from the Nash equilibrium quantity




























1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Period
German students Malaysian students
Malaysian managers
Figure 2.1: Quantities averaged across oligopoly markets at each time period (a
total of 25 periods). The straight line denotes the Nash equilibrium quantity,
74.25.
Regarding analysis over time, Figure 2.1 presents the quantities at each time
period, averaged across oligopoly markets. The most prominent inspection from
that figure is that at almost every time period the averaged quantities across mar-
kets selected by the Malaysian students are larger than the quantities selected
7In addition, using an F-P test we confirm that the results by Huck et al. (2004) in Berlin
are indistinguishable from our result in Kiel (2007) at the 10% s.l.
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by the other two samples. Formally, using an F-P test we find that the quan-
tities selected by Malaysian students are different from the quantities selected
by Malaysian managers and German students at the 1% s.l., respectively. In
addition, we observe a significant time-trend in the initial periods of the Ger-
man student treatment. This time-trend vanishes already after six periods.8 By
contrast, no significant time-trend is observed in the Malaysian treatments.
Finally, we pool the data across oligopoly markets and over time. Figure 2.2
presents the histograms of the pooled quantities in each treatment. Using a t-
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean quantity selected by the
German students is not different from the Nash equilibrium level of 74.25 at the
10% s.l. However, we reject this hypothesis for the Malaysian samples (at the 1%
s.l for the Malaysian student sample and at the 5% s.l for the Malaysian manager
sample).
German Students Malaysian Students Malaysian Managers
Average quantity 74.64 80.81 75.91
Across-market analysis n.d d. at 5% n.d
Over-time analysis n.d d. at 1% d. at 1%
Pooled-data analysis9 n.d d. at 1% d. at 5%
Table 2.2: Results of a one sample Wilcoxon sign rank test to find whether the
median quantities in the three treatments are statistically different from the Nash
equilibrium quantity of 74.25. “n.d” denotes “no difference” at the 10% s.l, “d”
denotes “significant difference” at a 10% s.l. or lower.
To sum up, Table 2.2 presents the results of a one-sample Wilcoxon sign rank
test and a t-test on whether triopoly markets perform at the Nash equilibrium
level. Accordingly, we can formulate:
Result 1: The Nash equilibrium is a quite accurate predictor for performance in
triopoly markets conducted with German students. By contrast, we reject the hy-
8Like Huck et al. (2004), we verified the time-trend by regressing the averaged quantities
on time. Huck et al. (2004) also observed a time-trend, however, in their case it vanishes after
four periods.
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(c) Malaysian manager treatment
Figure 2.2: Histograms of the quantities pooled across oligopoly markets and over
time. The dashed lines denote the benchmark quantities: 49.5 is the cooperative
quantity, 74.25 is the Nash quantity, and 99 is the competitive quantity.
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pothesis that both the Malaysian students and managers select the Nash quantity.
Test Difference between Treatments
Median test Malaysian students ∗ > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students = Malaysian managers = German students
(a) Analysis across Oligopoly Markets
Test Difference between Treatments
Mean test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Median test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students = Malaysian managers = German students
(b) Analysis over Time
Test Difference between treatments
Mean test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Median test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students ∗∗ > Malaysian managers > German students
(c) Analysis of Pooled Data
Table 2.3: The result of a mean test (t-test), a median test (Wilcoxon sign rank
test and Flinger and Policello Robust rank order test), and a variance test (Siegel-
Tukey test) testing whether the quantities selected in the three treatments differ
from each other. The symbols =, >, ∗ >, and ∗∗ > denote no difference at the
10% significant level, difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% s.l., respectively.
Table 2.3 presents the results of statistical tests regarding differences in per-
formance between subject pools. We can now formulate the next result.
Result 2: Malaysian students perform more competitively than both Malaysian
managers and German students.
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2.3.2 The effect of gender on performance
Table 2.4 presents the mean quantity (and standard deviation) according to gen-
der in each sample.10 Using a t-test, we find that the mean quantity selected
by German females is smaller (less competitive) than the mean quantity selected
by German males at the 1% s.l. Using the same procedure for the Malaysian
treatments, we find that for both samples Malaysian males are less competitive
than Malaysian females.11 These findings are reflected in the Pearson correlation
coefficient between male gender and the quantity selected by the subjects. For
the German sample it equals 0.22, whereas for the Malaysian students and man-
agers it is equals −0.13 and −0.15, respectively (all the results being significant
at the 1% level). Accordingly, we can portray result 3.
Result 3: In Germany and Malaysia gender affects subject performance in oppo-
site directions. German males are more competitive than German females, while
Malaysian males behave less competitively than Malaysian females.
Treatment Males Females
German students 26.63 (5.92) 24.00 (4.81)
Malaysian students 25.06 (10.67) 28.55 (14.80)
Malaysian managers 24.51 (8.91) 26.50 (8.72)
Table 2.4: The mean (and standard deviation) of the selected individual quanti-
ties, differentiated with respect to gender in the different treatments.
2.3.3 The profit calculator
In order to obtain further insights about subject behavior in the three treatments
we inspect the ‘profit-calculator’ data. Pooling the data across subjects and over
time and using a total of 2625 observations, we find that use intensity of the profit
calculator (number of calculations per period) is negatively correlated with the
10The analysis in this section is based on the pooled data across subjects (firms) and over
time.
11Significant at the 1% s.l.
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output decision.12 A possible interpretation of this result is that subjects who
decide to play collusively act in a more thoughtful way.
We also verify that the larger the average hypothetical quantity fed into the
profit calculator in a given period, the larger the actual quantity selected by the
subject at that period.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This study confirms the findings by Huck et al. (2004) that, by and large, the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a good predictor for subject performance in Cournot
triopoly experiments (at least, the quantities selected by the three subject pools
are closer to the Nash quantity than to the other two benchmark quantities).
However, while German students follow the Cournot strategy almost perfectly,
the Malaysian subjects’ quantities (both students’ and managers’) are signifi-
cantly different from the Cournot-Nash quantity. Furthermore, we find that the
Malaysian students perform more competitively than the Malaysian managers, a
result consistent with the previous studies by Fehr & List (2004), Alp´ızar et al.
(2004), and Cooper (2006).
Finally, we find that gender does affect subject performance. Regarding the
German student sample, we find that females behave more cooperatively than
males13, while the opposite holds for the Malaysian samples. This result supports
findings by Gneezy et al. (2009, forthcoming) suggesting that societal structure
is crucially linked to observed gender differences in behavior.
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2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.5.1 Instructions
• Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully! From
now until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to communicate
with the other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand, and we will answer them Individually.
• At the beginning of the experiment, each one of you will be assigned a
number. From then on, you and the other participants will be identified by
this number. Please keep it until you receive your payment. In addition,
there are two empty sheets of paper that you can use during the experiment.
• In this experiment you will repeatedly be asked to make decisions that can
earn you a reasonable amount of money. How much you earn depends not
only on your decisions but also on the decisions of the other participants.
• All participants receive the same instructions.
• In this experiment you represent a firm that produces and sells the same
product, as two other firms, in the market. You will be matched with the
same two firms during the whole experiment.
• You will stay anonymous for the other firms, both during and after the
experiment.
• In each period all firms have to make one decision, namely what quantity
they wish to produce.
• The cost of production is 1 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) per unit
(this holds for all firms).
• The following important rule holds: The higher the total (aggregate) quan-
tity produced by all firms, the lower the price in the market. Moreover,
from a certain amount of total output upwards the price will be zero.
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• Your profit per unit of output will be the difference between the market
price and the unit cost of 1 ECU. Note that you will make a loss if the
market price is below the unit cost. Your profit per period is thus equal to
the profit per unit multiplied by the number of units you sell.
• During the experiment you can use a ‘profit calculator’ before you decide on
the quantity to produce. You enter your quantity and the total (aggregate)
quantity of the other two firms and the ‘profit calculator’ will calculate your
earnings.
• In each period, the output decisions of the other two firms will be registered,
the corresponding price determined, and the profits computed.
• After each period, you will get information on your screen about the quan-
tity chosen by you, the aggregate quantity chosen by the other two firms,
your payoff in the current period, and your commutative payoff starting
from the first period.
• The experiment consists of exactly 25 periods.
• During the experiment, all payoffs are given in ECU. Each participant starts
with an initial amount of 500 ECU.
• After the experiment we will convert your payoff to RM. The exchange rate
is 66.5 ECU/RM, that is, 66.5 ECU is equal to 1 RM.14
• Your total profit in the experiment is the total amount you earned in the
25 periods of the experiment (plus the initial amount of 500 ECU).
• At the end of the experiment we will calculate your money payoff reward.
This will be done in way that ensures that the other participants will not
see how much you earned and you will not see how much they earned. You
will receive your money immediately in cash.
14The currencies and the exchange rates differed across treatments.
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2.5.2 Screens
Figure 2.3: The Cournot Triopoly experiment: The ‘decision screen’ in the first
period. The profit calculator appears in the left-hand side of the screen, while
subjects select their quantities in the right-hand side.
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Figure 2.4: The Cournot Triopoly experiment: The ‘decision screen’ from the
second period on. The profit calculator appears in the left-hand side of the
screen, while the results of the previous period are displayed in the upper part








Policy-makers are often required to make a selection among different policy in-
struments for protecting the environment. In this field, it is meanwhile widely
acknowledged that ‘market-based’ pollution control instruments, such as emission
taxes and tradable permits, are powerful and efficient tools to regulate pollution.
Early on, Kneese & Schultze (1975) emphasized that, among all available criteria
to judge the efficiency of the different pollution control policies, one of the most
important is the extent to which a given policy encourages firms to develop or
adopt low-pollution technologies. Since then, a large avenue of research started to
analyze, from theoretical and empirical viewpoint, the impact of different policy
instruments on technological change. The first attempts to rank environmental
policy instruments, taking the adoption of advanced technology as an efficiency
criterion, were made by Downing & White (1986), Malueg (1989), and Milli-
man & Prince (1989).1 Using aggregate cost saving as investment criteria, these
studies, however, focus on the effect on the whole industry and not on the in-
1See Requate (2005) for a survey about incentives provided by environmental policy instru-
ments to adopt and develop advanced abatement technology.
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centives of a single firm to adopt the new technology. Consequently, Kennedy &
Laplante (2000) and Requate & Unhold (2001, 2003) (for the case of adoption of
new technology), and Montero (2002a,b) and Fischer et al. (2003) (for the case of
technology innovation) suggested that equilibrium considerations should be taken
into account when studying the incentives to adopt (or develop) new technology.
In other words, the number of firms that adopt the new technology in equilibrium
should be endogenously determined.
Since Plott’s (1983) first laboratory experiment on emission trading, numer-
ous experimental studies have been published on permit trading.2 However, only
a few considered the adoption of advanced technology in permit markets. Ben-
David et al. (1999) considered a market where firms are producing a good using
capital and permits. In their setting, firms can use one of three possible produc-
tion technologies where permits and capital costs are inversely related (i.e. the
cleanest technology is the most expensive in terms of capital). Each period the
firms choose their technology for the next period (however, choosing a ‘cleaner’
technology is irreversible). Ben-David et al. (1999) introduce heterogeneity via
the marginal abatement cost of switching from one technology to another. They
find that heterogeneity leads to lower efficiency from trade. Hizen et al. (2001)
and Kusakawa & Saijo (2003) investigated emission trading using either bilateral
trading, or double auction. They define investment irreversibility such that when
a firm is abating one unit of emission and then emitting this unit, it incurs a
cost. They find that investment irreversibility and time lag in abatement reduce
efficiency. Finally, Gangadharan et al. (2005) examine the interaction between
banking of permits and (irreversible) investment in a cleaner technology. They
consider a market with six types of firms differing with respect to production
capacity and cleanliness, when production capacity and cleanliness are inversely
related. Permits were freely allocated to those firms, which could relocate them
through a double auction. Moreover, the firms could invest a fixed amount, the
same for all types, to produce more for the same amount of pollution emitted.
The effect of investment, however, is asymmetric, such that dirty firms gain more
by investing. Gangadharan et al. (2005), in contrast to our design, held the
amount of pollution emitted fixed and varied the quantity of output produced.
Additionally, information about investment was announced publicly in their ex-
2A summary of the literature is given in Muller & Mestelman (1998) and in Bohm (2003).
50
3.1 Introduction
periment. They find that firms tend to over-invest and over-bank. In other words,
not only ‘dirty’ firms invest in advanced technology but also ‘cleaner’ firms that
could otherwise invest in more productive alternatives. The result is sub-optimal
market efficiency.
This paper centers on the case investigated by Requate & Unhold (2001), when
the regulator takes into account the potential technological change when decid-
ing on the environmental policy to be applied. This is the case of the European
countries as a result of the application of the Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control (IPPC) Directive 96/61. The IPPC legislation requires emission
reduction and environmental improvements on the basis of what is achievable
with the best techniques available to individual industrial sectors. The analysis
of Requate & Unhold (2001) in the case of industry characterized by many (a
continuum of) asymmetric firms demonstrates that in a subgame perfect equilib-
rium when the regulator sets the optimal Pigouvian tax, or alternatively, issues
the optimal number of permits the share of firms adopting the new technology is
socially optimal.
Testing the behavior of firms in the laboratory under a Pigouvian tax3 does not
make much sense, since even when a firm deviates from the theoretical allocation
it does not affect the maximization considerations of the others. However, this
is not the case when the government issues emission permits, since expectations
about the price of permits depend on the other firms’ behavior. Thus, auctioned
permits may yield different results than grandfathered permits. This study tests,
in the laboratory, the theoretical findings of Requate & Unhold (2001) that in an
industry characterized by many small asymmetric firms, when the regulator issues
the socially optimal number of permits, auctioning and grandfathering provide the
same incentives to invest in advanced technology. Although Requate & Unhold
(2001) did not specify an auction design, we investigate the behavior of firms
under two allocation policies (free allocation of permits also called grandfathering
vs. auctioned permits) and under two different auction designs (ascending clock
auction vs. single unit double auction). Besides testing the investment behavior,
we evaluate the efficiency of the policies in allocating permits and in maximizing
the total social welfare of the economy. Moreover, we employ the low-payoff menu
of paired lottery (Holt & Laury, 2002) to see whether attitudes towards risk affect
3Under the condition of perfect information.
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subjects’ performance in the laboratory.
Our results confirm Requate and Unholds’ proposition that auctioning and
grandfathering do not yield different results regarding investment in advanced
abatement technology. In particular, the different treatments yield similar re-
sults regarding investment in advanced abatement technology and regarding the
total social welfare of the economy. However, regarding efficiency in allocation of
permits, the double auction outperforms the ascending clock auction.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we present the theoretical
model. In section 3.3 we describe the experimental design and procedure. In
Section 3.4 we present the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Background
This section portrays the theoretical model serving as a basis for our experiment.
The model outlined here is a discrete version of the model proposed by Requate
& Unhold (2001).
Let us consider an industry consisting of n polluting firms, and K different
initial technologies. Each firm i = {1, ..., n} is endowed with one of these initial
technologies and can invest to adopt the advanced technology a, the same for all
firms. The firms’ technologies are represented by their abatement cost function
Ci(ei, k) with k = 1, ..., K, a. We assume that for any targeted emission level e we
have Ci(e, k) > 0 for e < e¯k, where e¯k is the baseline emission level of technology
k = 1, ..., K. Investment in advanced abatement technology leads to both lower
abatement and lower marginal abatement costs, i.e. Ci(e, k) > Ci(e, a) > 0 and
−Cie(e, k) > −Cie(e, a) for all e ≤ e¯k, where −Cie(e, k) = −∂Cie(e, k)/∂e is the
marginal abatement cost. We denote by k(i) the technology initially owned by
firm i. Without a loss of generality we assume that the firms’ abatement cost func-
tions are ordered from the dirtiest to the least dirty: Ci(e, k(i)) ≥ Ci+1(e, k(i+1)
and −Cie(e, k(i)) ≥ −Ci+1e (e, k(i+1). Installing the new technology causes a fixed
cost, F > 0, for simplicity it is the same for all firms. Moreover, when setting
the optimal policy, the regulator uses an increasing and convex social damage




A social planner minimizes total social costs with respect to emissions and
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the number of firms. When the fixed investment cost is independent of the initial
technology, it is always optimal that, if not all firms are supposed to adopt the
advanced technology, at least those firms with the highest abatement costs should
invest, i.e. there will be some index j, such that the firms i = 1, ..., j will invest.
Exploiting that Ci(ei, a) = C
j(ej, a) and ei = ej for all i ≤ j , the social planner’s
problem can therefore be written as:
min
{j,e1,...ej ,ea}




where E = jej +
n∑
i=j+1
ei. Clearly for i > j , ei depends only on the type of
technology k.
Denoting the optimal aggregate marginal abatement cost when the first j firms
have adopted the advanced abatement technology byAMAC∗(E, j), the regulator
will choose the optimal aggregate emission level, E∗, satisfying
D′(E∗) = AMAC∗(E∗, j) (3.1)
We assume that a regulating authority uses tradable permits to control emissions.
Therefore, it will issue of a number of permits, L = E∗, to enforce the aggregate
emission level E∗. Denoting the market price for permits by σ, a firm with
technology i chooses an emission level ei(σ) such that its marginal abatement
cost equals the price of permits: −C ′i(ei(σ)) = σ.
Now a firm with original technology i has an incentive to adopt the advanced
technology a if:
Ci(ei(σ, a), a) + F + σ[ei(σ, a)− eˆi)] < Ci(ei(σ, k), k) + σ[ei(σ, k)− eˆi] (3.2)
where eˆi is firm i’s initial endowment of permits, if there is any. Condition (3.2)
indicates that investment is profitable if the total cost consisting of abatement
cost, expenditures on permits, and investment cost is lower than the abatement
cost plus expenditures for permits without investment. This condition depends
crucially on the permits’ price. Even for identical firms it can be the case that in
equilibrium some firms adopt the new technology and some do not (see Requate
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& Unhold, 2003). In fact, the price of permits and the number of firms are both
determined endogenously. These authors show that the socially optimal allocation
can be theoretically implemented, by issuing the ex-ante socially optimal number
of emission permits for both, a completely symmetric model (see Requate &
Unhold, 2003), and an asymmetric model (see Requate & Unhold, 2001). In our
experimental study, we therefore assume that the regulator issues the optimal
number of permits. Requate & Unhold (2001, 2003) also show that the social
optimum can be decentralized irrespective of permits being allocated for free
(grandfathered) or being auctioned off. In these papers, the auction design is
not specified. It is just assumed that the auction induces the competitive market
clearing price.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
This section thoroughly describes the experimental design and procedure. The
experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree experimental soft-
ware (Fischbacher, 2007) and was held at the experimental laboratory of the
University of Kiel. We aim at testing the theoretical predictions by Requate
& Unhold (2001) by issuing the ex-ante, socially optimal number of emission
permits, and hypothesize that the socially optimal level of investment would be
achieved regardless of (i) the way emission allowances are initially allocated, and
of (ii) the auction design. We therefore conduct several treatments, varying the
way of initial allocation (free vs. costly) and varying the auction design.
Typically, under a system of grandfathering, firms can bilaterally trade per-
mits. To mimic this it is natural to implement a single unit double (oral) auction.
Under the so called auctioning-system of permits, several designs are possible. We
chose an ascending clock auction because of its simplicity. By doing so, two fea-
tures are different between the treatments: The allocation mechanism and the
auction design. Thus, in order to investigate the effect of the initial allocation
of permits, or of the auction design on firms’ performance, we had to conduct a
treatment with only one feature different from each of the other two treatments.
Therefore, we conducted an additional treatment where permits are initially al-
located for free, but the price is determined by an ascending clock auction.
Furthermore, we conducted two types of treatments, the single-period and
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the multi-period treatments. The single-period treatments consist of two phases:
In the first phase subjects decide whether or not to invest and in the second
phase they participate in an auction. This auction will determine their number
of permits and, thus, their emission level (=abatement level). In the real world,
however, investment does not always happen simultaneously. Firms might first
wait and observe the other firms’ behavior, and only then decide whether or not
to invest in the new technology. In this sense, we conducted a further series of
treatments where the relevant time horizon is four periods. As in the single-period
treatments each period consists of two phases: In the first phase subjects decide
whether or not to invest (only if they did not invest in the previous periods), and
in the second phase they participate in an auction. We refer to these treatments
as the multi-period treatments. In total we refer to the different treatments as
follows:
• SAAC = single period auctioning off permits through an ascending clock
auction
• SGAC = single period grandfathering and relocating permits through an
ascending clock auction
• SGDA = single period grandfathering and relocating permits through a
single unit double auction
• MAAC = multi period auctioning off permits through an ascending clock
auction
• MGDA = multi period grandfathering and relocating permits through a
single unit double auction
The SGAC treatment was conducted to investigate whether possible differences
in performance between the policy instruments are due to the initial allocation
of permits or due to the choice of auction design. Since we did not observe a
difference between the instruments, we did not conduct a multi-period treatment
with grandfathering and ascending clock auction
We consider an industry consisting of 18 firms of five different types k =
{T1, ..., T5} characterized by their marginal abatement technologies. In each pe-
riod each firm earns an unconditional default profit of Π0 = 1200. The fixed
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investment cost is F = 580 in the single-period, and F = 2000 in the multi-
period treatments. Profits are indicated in experimental currency units (ECU),
which were then converted into e at an exchange rate of ECU40=e1 in the single-
period treatments, or ECU160=e1 in the multi-period treatments. Finally, we
set the social damage function by ,D(E) = E2/4, leading to the marginal damage
E/2, where E =
∑18
i=1 ei denotes aggregate emissions.
4 The marginal abatement
technologies of the different types are given in Table 3.1, while the number of
firms and the allocation of permits (in the treatments with grandfathering) per
type are given in Table 3.2.
MAC Emissions (ei) per technology type
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 a
0 20 18 16 14 12 7
10 19 17 15 13 11 6
20 18 16 14 12 10 5
30 17 15 13 11 9 4
40 16 14 12 10 8 3
50 15 13 11 9 7 2
60 14 12 10 8 6 1
70 13 11 9 7 5 0
80 12 10 8 6 4 0
90 11 9 7 5 3 0
100 10 8 6 4 2 0
110 9 7 5 3 1 0
120 8 6 4 2 0 0
130 7 5 3 1 0 0
140 6 4 2 0 0 0
150 5 3 1 0 0 0
160 4 2 0 0 0 0
170 3 1 0 0 0 0
180 2 0 0 0 0 0
190 1 0 0 0 0 0
200 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.1: Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) per technology type. T1, ..., T5 de-
note the conventional technologies, while a denotes the advanced abatement tech-
nology.
4Alternatively, from reasons that are explained bellow, our analysis includes the case of a
flat MD curve (MD=55).
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Firm type T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Number of firms 4 3 4 3 4
Permits allocated 8 7 6 5 4
Table 3.2: Firm type (according to the initial technologies), number of firms per
type, and permits allocated to each firm (in the treatments with grandfathering.)
Since we have conducted both single and multi-period treatments, we define a
run as the phase consisting of one period in the single-period treatments, and of
four successive periods (i.e., periods 1-4, 5-8, 9-12) in the multi-period treatments.
In all treatments, once a firm has decided to invest in the new technology, it is
assigned the new technology for the remaining periods of the run.5 Table 3.3
presents the experimental design.
Treatment L* Allocation Auction Investment Permits Periods Runsmechanism design sustainability validity
SAAC 110 A AC each period each period 6 -
SGAC 108 GR AC each period each period 4 -
SGDA 108 GR DA each period each period 6 -
MAAC 110 A AC each run each period 12 3
MGDA 108 GR DA each run each period 12 3
Every treatment includes 2 sessions with 18 participants
Common to all treatments: Π0=1200, j∗=7, n=18, k=5
Table 3.3: The experimental design, a total of 5 treatments: three single-period
treatments and two multi-period treatments. “A” denotes auctioning off permits,
“GR” denotes grandfathering, “AC” denotes ascending clock auction, “DA” de-
notes double auction. run=period in the single-period treatments but not in the
multi-period treatments.
For our parameters, the optimal allocation is characterized as follows: All
firms assigned the technologies T1 and T2 should invest, while the others should
not, as is illustrated by Figure 3.1. The optimal number of permits to be issued
is L = 110, and the optimal marginal damage is equal to 55.
5However, in each period during a run, a firm can invest in the advanced technology if it
did not invest before.
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AMAC with the old technologies AMAC if T1 and T2 invests Marginal Damage
Ê*=L*
τ*=σ*
Figure 3.1: Socially optimal instrument level, tax and emission permits
To ensure that subjects understand the economic situation, only students with
at least a Bachelor’s degree in Economics were recruited to participate in the ex-
periment. Second, every experimental session starts with a tax treatment and is
then followed by a permit treatment. This means that instead of trading permits,
emissions were taxed. The purpose of conducting the tax treatment before the
permit treatment was to make subjects familiar with the pure investment deci-
sion without facing the uncertainty induced through the outcome on the permit
market, in particular regarding permit price. Finally, we did not impose an au-
tomatic time limit on the investment decision, giving the subjects enough time
to consider their decisions. When, however, some subjects did not make their
decision after 15 minutes, we told them to reach a decision.
3.3.1 The tax treatments
Assuming that the regulator anticipates the new technology, we set the ex-ante
optimal tax rate equal to τ = 55. According to the above settings, the profit of
firm i, in period t, is the following:
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Πi,t =
Π0 − Ci (ei,t, a)− τei,t if invested in period t (or earlier),Π0 − Ci (ei,t, k)− τei,t if not invested in period t (or earlier),




t=1Πi,t − F , if the
firm invested during the run, or otherwise Πtotali =
∑T
t=1Πi,t, where T = 1 for the
single-period treatment and T = 4 for the multi-period treatment.
3.3.2 The permit treatments
As soon as the tax treatment had been finished and after a short break, the permit
treatment started. In all three permit treatments we announce that the regulator
issues (auctions off or grandfathers) a number of permits equal to L = 1106.
When permits are auctioned off through an ascending clock auction
(in the SAAC and MAAC treatments), we set the initial price equal to 5 ECU, the
firms have 40 seconds to place their demand for permits (their requested number
of permits) at that price. If the aggregate permits’ demand is higher than the
permits’ supply (110 permits), the price is increased by 10 ECU (such that the
next price is 15 ECU, then 25 ECU, and so on). The auction then continues until
the demanded quantity placed by the firms is smaller or equal to the permits’
supply of 110. If this is the case, the auction ends and each firm obtains its
demanded quantity at this last price.7
When the grandfathering is followed by an ascending clock auction
(SGAC), the procedure is similar to the SAAC treatment, except that now for the
given price, the subjects have 40 seconds to place their demand (their requested
number of permits) or their supply (the number of permits they offer). If the
aggregate demand is smaller or equal to the aggregate supply, the auction ends
and each bidder gets his or her demanded quantity at this last price.8
6or 108 due to allocation considerations in the treatments with grandfathering.
7If a subject does not submit her demand at the given price when the time is over, the
computer program automatically submits the subject’s demand from the previous price. If
the subject does not submit her demand in the initial price, (5 ECU), the computer program
automatically submits her maximum emission level. However, this has rarely occurred.
8If the demand is equal to the supply, then also each offerer sells her offered quantity.
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The profit of firm i in period t, for the treatments with ascending clock auction
(SAAC, SGAC, MAAC), is the following:
Πi,t =
Π0 − Ci (ei,t, a)− σei,tZi,t if invested in period t (or earlier),Π0 − Ci (ei,t, k)− σei,tZi,t if not invested in period t (or earlier),
where k = T1, ..., T5. Here Zi,t = 1 in the case of auctioning off permits, and
Zi,t ∈ {1,−1} in the case of grandfathering, depending on whether the firm buys
(Zi,t = 1) or sells (Zi,t = −1) permits at the given period. Total profit is defined
the same as in the tax treatment (section 3.3.1).
When the grandfathering is followed by a single unit double auction
(in the SGDA, and MGDA treatments), the subjects have 3 minutes to buy and
sell permits in the market. They can buy and sell permits either by submitting
a bid or an offer, or by accepting a standing bid or an offer. The bids (offers) are
ordered from highest to lowest (lowest to highest). If two bids (offers) are tied,
the one entered first has priority. After a permit has been traded the auction
continues for the next permit. The profit to firm i in period t is given by
Πi,t =
Π0 − Ci (ei,t, a)− x if invested in period t (or earlier),Π0 − Ci (ei,t, k)− x if not invested in period t (or earlier),
where k = T1, ..., T5, and x is defined as x =
∑J
j=1 σi,j,tZi,j,t, where J is the
number of trades, σi,j,t is the price subject i pays or receives in trade j, and
Zi,j,t ∈ {1,−1} indicates whether he or she buys (Zi,j,t = 1) or sells (Zi,j,t = −1)
a permit. Net trade sum up to
∑J
j=1 Zi,j,t = ei,t− eˆi where eˆi is subject i′s initial
endowment of permits. Total profit is defined the same as in the tax treatment
(section 3.3.1).
However, if the demand is smaller than the supply, a random mechanism determines who of
the offerers will sell her offered quantity and who will not.
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3.3.3 Attitude towards risk and subjects’ performance
An interesting question is whether risk attitude of subjects could account for
their investment and speculative behavior. For this purpose, we employ the
low-payoff menu of paired lottery (Holt & Laury, 2002). This menu measures
attitudes toward risk in levels indicating a risk-attitude coefficient ranging from
1 (high degree of risk-loving) to 10 (high degree of risk-aversion). A coefficient of
4 denotes risk neutrality. Appendix 3.6.1 provides a detailed description of the
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Figure 3.2: The distribution of the risk-attitude coefficients, a total of 173 subjects
(average: 5.02, standard deviation: 1.58). Coefficients in the range 1-3 indicate
risk loving, coefficient of 4 indicates risk neutrality, and coefficients in the range
5-10 indicate risk aversion
3.4 Results
This section starts by reporting the results of the tax treatment and then proceeds
with the examination of the different regulation policies (SAAC, SGAC, SGDA,
MAAC, MGDA). We are interested in possible deviations from (i) the optimal
investment in advanced abatement technology, (ii) the efficient allocations of
permits (reflected in the total abatement costs given the investment decision),
and (iii) the optimal total social welfare in the economy.
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3.4.1 The tax treatments
Since the tax treatment is basically a maximization problem, non-optimal deci-
sions of the subjects are considered as ‘mistakes’. Consequently, we identify three
types of mistakes: (i) A non-optimal abatement decision, i.e., a firm abates more
or less units than optimal under the given tax rate; (ii) non-optimal timing of
investment in the multi-period treatments, i.e., a firm invests after the first pe-
riod of a run; (iii) non-optimal investment decision, i.e., either a firm that should
not invest, does invest, or a firm that should invest, does not invest. Table 3.4
presents the percentage of mistakes in the first and last runs of the treatment.
% of investment mistakes % of timing mistakes % of abatement mistakes
The first run 19.12 − 26.87
The last run 7.85 − 8.79
(a) The single-period tax treatment (126 subjects)
% of investment mistakes % of timing mistakes % of abatement mistakes
The first run 25.00 5.55 29.16
The last run 8.33 4.16 8.33
(b) The multi-period tax treatment (72 subjects)
Table 3.4: Percentage of mistakes in the first run compared with the last run of
the tax treatments. In the multi-period treatment we refer to abatement mistakes
in the first and last periods of the corresponding runs.
Table 3.4 illustrates that the percentage of mistakes is substantially lower in
the last run compared with the first run, indicating that at the end of the treat-
ment the subjects understand the economic situation in a much better way. At
the end of the treatment, less than 10% of the decisions taken by the subjects are
considered as mistakes. Note that timing mistakes were almost never observed,
even in the first run.
Result 1: At the end of the tax treatment subjects significantly improve their




3.4.2 Investment decisions in permit markets
Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of investment depending on the initial tech-













































































































(d) The multi-period treatments (last run)
Figure 3.3: Percentage of firms investing in the new technology per conventional
technology type
Using a Flinger and Policello robust rank order test (F-P test) to compare be-
tween the single-period SAAC and SGAC treatments, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the initial allocation of permits does not affect the investment
pattern, at the 10% s.l.
Result 2a: The initial allocation of permits (auctioning vs. grandfathering) does
not affect the pattern of investment.
This is a remarkable result because economic theory predicts final permit
allocation to be invariant to the initial allocation when the number of firms is
9This figure present the ‘clean’ data, after omitting subjects who made more than a single
mistake in the last two periods of the tax treatment - on average 2 subjects per treatment.
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sufficiently large (see Kennedy & Laplante, 2000; Montero, 2002a,b; Requate &
Unhold, 2001, 2003).
Comparing the single-period SGAC and SGDA treatments by using an F-P
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the auction design does not affect
investment decision at the 10% s.l.
Result 2b: The auction design (an ascending clock auction vs. a single unit
double auction) does not affect the pattern of investment.
This result is notable since it justifies abstraction from the particular auction
design as is done in many theoretical papers and textbooks on competitive permit
trading (for instance Baumol & Oates, 1988; Kolstad, 2000; Tietenberg, 2006).
Finally, comparing the single-period SAAC and SGDA treatments to their
corresponding multi-period treatments using an F-P test, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no significant difference between the treatments at the 10%
level.
Result 2c: The single-period treatments and the multi-period treatments yield
similar patterns of investment.
In line with result 2c we also observe that only 10% and 3% of the firms who
invested during the MAAC and the MGDA treatments, respectively, invested in a
different period than the first period of each run. This means that, by and large,
firms do not observe the market before investing in the multi-period treatments,
but rather decide whether to invest or not at the beginning of each run as in the
single-period treatments.
3.4.3 Characteristics of the permit markets
In this section we investigate the different permit markets with respect to prices
and volumes. We proceed by analyzing the relationships between prices, the risk-




Table 3.5 compares the observed average prices10 and volumes with their ex-
pected values depending on the observed pattern of investment. Recall that mar-
ket prices and volumes of trade reflect the size of demand and supply of permits
in the market (which depend on the investments).
Treatment Observed Expected
Price Volume Price Volume
SAAC 55.00 103.81 45.45− 53.63 110
(11.83) (5.32) (8.20− 9.24) (−)
SGAC 60.00 32.87 49.16− 59.16 35
(10.69) (5.66) (8.86) (3.42)
SGDA 64.84 44.16 49.16− 59.16 35.41
(10.01) (10.56) (7.93) (3.77)
MAAC 53.33 102.39 36.66− 46.66 110
(6.37) (5.00) (5.16) (−)
MGDA 58.21 41.25 43.33− 53.33 35.66
(11.82) (3.77) (5.16) (2.42)
Table 3.5: Comparison of observed average prices and trade volumes of permits
with the expected average prices and trade volumes given the observed pattern
of investment (standard deviations are given in brackets)
Table 3.5 shows that the observed prices are higher than the expected prices
in all treatments. Moreover, we find too little trading in the treatments using the
ascending clock auction and excessive trading in the treatments using the double
auction. A possible explanation for over-trading in the treatments with double
auction is that these treatments allow for speculative trading (defined as buying
and selling permits by the same firm in a given period). Table 3.6 presents the
net trading in the DA treatments, defined as the absolute value of permits at the
end of the period minus initial permits.
10The price range is a result of the stepwise aggregate marginal abatement cost function
which we are using. For example, when we allocate 110 (or 108) permits and only firms of type




Treatment Observed volume Expected volume
Net trading Total trading (net trading)
SGDA 30.83 44.16 35.41
(7.95) (10.56) (3.77)
MGDA 33.04 41.25 35.66
(3.16) (3.77) (2.42)
Table 3.6: Comparison of the observed average net trading volume and the total
average trading volume of permits with the expected average volume given the
observed pattern of investment in the DA treatments (standard deviations are
given in brackets)
Table 3.6 illustrates that there is also too little-(net) trading in the DA treat-
ments compared with the expected trading volume according to the theoretical
prediction.
3.4.3.1 Factors influencing investment
To better understand what factors are influencing the investment behavior in the
different treatments, we estimate a Probit model (using the pooled data across
firms and over time) for the single-period treatments.11 The explanatory variables
are the following: investment in the previous period (a dummy variable obtaining
the value of 1 when the firm invested in the previous period), the initial technology
assigned (a discrete variable ranging between 1 for the least efficient technology
and 5 for the most efficient technology), the average price in the previous period,
and the risk-attitude coefficient (see Holt & Laury, 2002) ranging between 1 and
10. The estimation results are given in Table 3.7.
11We also estimated a random-effect panel Probit model to account for individual hetero-
geneity, but a likelihood ratio test indicates that the pooled model is preferred.
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Treatment SAAC SGAC SGDA
Investment (t− 1) 1.17*** 0.89** 1.00***
(0.25) (0.42) (0.26)
Technology -0.48*** -1.23*** -0.76***
(0.08) (0.23) (0.11)
Risk-attitude coef. 0.01 -0.19 0.19*
(0.06) (0.16) (0.11)
Average price (t− 1) 0.02*** 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Cons -0.82 2.86*** -0.46
(0.66) (1.56) (0.1.28)
LR test (K-1) 77.97*** 95.34*** 115.46***
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.33 0.67 0.49
McFadden’s Pseudo adj. R2 0.29 0.60 0.44
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Table 3.7: Probit estimations of the different single-period treatments (Std. Err.
are given in brackets). The dependent variable: Investment at period t.
We find that the initial technology and investment in the previous period are
significantly correlated with investment in all treatments. The result that the ini-
tial technology affects investment stems from the asymmetric effect of investment
according to the firms’ initial technologies (i.e. the least efficient firms gain more
by investing). The result that investment in the previous period is correlated with
current period investment may indicate state dependence (Heckman, 1981). This
means that, for the single-period treatments, once a subject has invested (has not
invested) in a certain period, there is a higher probability that he will invest (not
invest) in the following period, ceteris paribus. Prices in previous periods signif-
icantly affect investment only in the SAAC treatment.12 This result is puzzling
since the expected price of permits is supposed to affect the firm’s consideration
in whether or not to adopt the advanced technology. Therefore, we expected
that the previous period price would have a significant effect on investment in all
treatments. Finally, the risk-attitude coefficient is significantly correlated with
investment only in SGDA treatment. We can summarize our findings as follows:
12For the DA treatment, we also estimated other models including the average selling price
per subject and the average buying price per subject (including only the transactions that were




Result 3a: A dirtier initial technology and investment in the previous period are
positively correlated with investment in all treatments. A tendency towards risk
aversion is positively correlated with investment in the SGDA treatment (the risk
attitude coefficient was not significant in the other treatments). A high permit
price in the previous period is positively correlated with investment in the SAAC
treatment (the previous period permit price coefficient was not significant in the
other treatments).
3.4.3.2 Factors influencing speculative behavior
Lets us define a speculator as a trader who sells and buys permits within the
same period. In order to reveal the factors influencing speculative behavior we
estimate the Probit model presented in Table 3.8.13
Variable Coef. (Std. Err.)












LR test (K-1) 35.24***
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.19
McFadden’s Pseudo adj. R2 0.12
*, **, *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Table 3.8: Probit estimation of the SGDA treatment. The dependent variable:
Speculation at period t.
Table 3.8 indicates that speculation in the previous period, average price
13As in section 3.4.3.1, We also estimated a random-effect panel Probit model to account for
individual heterogeneity, but a likelihood ratio test indicates that the pooled model is preferred.
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in the previous period, and a low risk-attitude coefficient (a tendency towards
risk-loving) are positively and significantly correlated with the current period
speculation. These findings are quite intuitive since the incentives to speculate
depend on the average buying and selling price, moreover, we expect speculators
to have a tendency towards risk loving. Finally, we also observe state dependence
(Heckman, 1981) as in the case of investment behavior.
Result 3b: Speculative behavior in the previous period, a high average price in
the previous period, and a tendency towards risk-loving are positively correlated
with speculative behavior in the current period.
3.4.4 Efficiency in allocation of permits
Besides optimal investment, an additional measure of efficiency in permits market
is the efficiency in allocation of permits. This is measured by the total abatement
cost (TAC) given the observed pattern of investment. In other words, we test
whether firms (subjects) make efficient use of the auction to minimize the TAC
of the industry. Table 3.9 presents the average observed TAC with the average
efficient TAC given the observed pattern of investment. The efficiency ratio
(observed TAC/efficient TAC) is a measure of efficient allocation of permits.
The lower the ratio, the higher is the efficiency of the market. When permits are
allocated efficiently (and the marginal abatement costs are balanced between all
firms)14 the efficiency ratio is equal to 1.
14Since the number of permits in our experiment is an integer, it can happen that the
marginal abatement cost is different between the firms (by at most one unit).
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Treatment Observed TAC Efficient TAC Efficiency ratio
SAAC 3679.09 2782.72 1.32
(1426.94) (963.68) (0.26)
SGAC 3957.50 3294.16 1.30
(1117.63) (976.97) (0.11)
SGDA 3328.75 2577.50 1.20
(1084.25) (955.77) (0.09)
MAAC 2800.41 2038.33 1.36
(799.82) (333.07) (0.26)
MGDA 3094.58 2643.33 1.17
(674.28) (505.29) (0.09)
Table 3.9: Average observed and efficient TAC (given the observed pattern of in-
vestment) in the different treatments (standard deviations are given in brackets).
The efficiency ratio is defined as observed TAC/efficient TAC.
Using a Kruskall-Wallis test to compare between the series of efficiency ratios,
we do not find a significant difference between the three single-period treatments
at the 10% level. Using an F-P test to compare between each pair of treatments,
we find that the SGDA outperforms the SGAC treatment at the 10% s.l. We,
however, do not find differences between the SGDA and the SAAC treatments
at the 10% s.l. Using an F-P test, comparing between the two the multi-period
treatments, we find that the MGDA treatment outperforms the MAAC treatment
at the 10% level (all the results reported are of two-sided test).
Result 4: Regarding efficiency in allocation of permits, the SGDA treatment
outperforms the SGAC treatment, and the MGDA treatment outperforms the
MAAC.
3.4.5 Total social welfare in permit markets
Finally, we evaluate the regulation policies through comparing the total social wel-
fare (TSW) defined as the sum of the unconditional profits minus the investment
and abatement costs across firms, minus the total damage to the society from
pollution. We consider two cases: an increasing marginal damage (MD) schedule
(MD = E/2), and a constant marginal damage schedule with MD = 55. A flat
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MD schedule is chosen following Tol’s (2005) estimation of Carbon Dioxide emis-
sions.15 Table 3.10 presents the average efficiency ratios (defined as: observed
TSW/efficient TSW ) for each treatment. Note that, in this case, in contrast to
the efficiency measure on the total abatement costs, the higher the efficiency ratio
the higher the efficiency in the market.











Table 3.10: Mean (and standard deviations) of the ‘efficiency ratio’ (defined as,
observed TSW/efficient TSW ) series of the Total Social Welfare (TSW), cal-
culated assuming a flat marginal damage (MD=55) schedule or assuming an
increasing marginal damage schedule (MD=E/2), in the different treatments.
Regarding a flat MD schedule, comparing the series of efficiency ratios be-
tween the different single-period treatments, using a Kruskall-Wallis test and an
F-P test for each pair of treatments, we do not find differences between treatments
at the 10% s.l. However, using an F-P test, comparing between the multi-period
treatments, we find that the MAAC treatment outperforms the MGDA treat-
ment at the 10% s.l. Applying the same tests for the TSW with increasing MD
schedule we do not find a difference between the single-period and between the
multi-period treatments, respectively, at the 10% s.l.
Result 5: Overall, the different treatments do not perform differently with re-
spect to total welfare losses.
15Tol (2005) estimates a rather flat MD schedule (under a 4-5% social rate of discount, he




This study aims at testing, by means of a laboratory experiment, whether both
methods of initial allocation of permits and the choice of auction design affect
the incentives to invest in advanced abatement technology in tradable permit
markets with small asymmetric firms. Altogether, we conducted a total of five
treatments, varying the way the permits are initially allocated (costly vs. free),
the auction design (ascending clock auction vs. single unit double auction), and
the relevant time horizon within the treatments (single-period vs. multi-period).
Regarding investment in advanced technology, we do not find significant differ-
ences between the treatments, a result in line with many theoretical predictions.
We also observed, as in Gangadharan et al. (2005), that at least some firms of
each initial technology invest in the new technology (even firms with the cleanest
technology). In particular, we find under-investment by the inefficient firms and
over-investment by efficient firms.
Regarding the total social welfare, we do not find significant differences be-
tween the treatments. However, regarding optimal allocation of permits we find
weak evidence that the single unit double auction outperforms the ascending
clock auction. Thus, we deliver a further argument in favor of the double auction
trading institution. The result that grandfathering is not inferior to auctioning in
any of the evaluation criteria16, is particularly interesting in light of the tendency
of economists to prefer auctioning on grandfathering (see, for instance, Cramton
& Kerr, 2002).
In summary, this paper’s novelty comes from testing the effect of initial allo-
cation of permits on adoption of advanced technology. Moreover, it also tests the
effect of two alternative auction designs on adoption of advanced technology. Our
results confirm that in a market consisting of a sufficiently large number of firms,
the initial allocation of permits does not affect the investment behavior. Our
findings also indicate that, by and large, both auction designs perform similarly.
Thus, we support the abstraction from the auction design when evaluating the
effect of emission permits as a policy instrument. Finally, although laboratory
experiments were often used to investigate the static efficiency of alternative en-
16Our analysis does not include political economy considerations such as the costs of lobbying
when grandfathering is implemented, or that grandfathering may set up an entry barrier, etc.
72
3.5 Concluding Remarks
vironmental policy instruments under various conditions, there was not much use
of experiments to investigate the dynamic efficiency of adopting (or developing)
advanced technologies. Thus, experimental economics should still clarify issues
relating to the incentives to adopt or develop advanced technologies.
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3.6.1 Holt and Laury’s (2002) menu of paired lottery
Holt and Laury’s (2002) low payoff menu of paired lottery (see Figure 3.4) requires
subjects to choose between two lotteries: A and B. The ‘solid’ lottery A includes
a probability to win a high payoff of e2 and a (complementary) probability to
win a low payoff of e1.6.17 Similarly, the ‘riskier’ lottery B includes a probability
to win a high payoff of e3.85 and a (complementary) probability to win a low
payoff of e0.1. The probabilities to win the high (and low) payoffs are the same
for both lotteries A and B. The probability to win the high payoff increases
gradually during the lottery choice menu in increments of 10%, such that from
a probability of 10% to win the high payoff and a probability of 90% to win
the low payoff in the first lottery-choice it reaches a probability of 100% to win
the high payoff and 0% to win the low payoff in the last choice of the menu.
As the probability to win the high payoff in both lotteries increases, subjects
are expected to switch from A to B. For instance, a risk neutral subject, who
chooses the lottery according to the highest expected value, will choose 4 times
A before switching to B. Consequently, from the pattern of choices observed, a
risk-attitude coefficient which corresponds to the number of consecutive choices
of lottery A before switching to lottery B, is computed.
17In the original study by Holt & Laury (2002) the payoffs are in US$.
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10/10 of €2.00, 0/10 of €1.60 
 
 






Figure 3.4: Holt and Laury’s (2002) menu of paired lottery
75
3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.6.2 Translated instructions (the multi-period treatments)
General instructions
Welcome. You are taking part in an economic experiment on decision making.
The experiment consists of two parts. Both parts last over several rounds and in
each part you can earn a reasonable amount of money. During the experiment
your payoff is measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). At the end of
the experiment it will be converted into e at an exchange rate of 160:1, i.e. 160
ECU = 1e and it will be paid to you privately in cash.
At the beginning of the experiment each one of you will be assigned a number.
From then on, you and the other participants will be identified by this number,
please keep it until you receive your payment. In addition, There are two empty
sheets of paper that you can use during the experiment. You will also find a
calculator on the computer screen for your use. No communication is allowed
with the other participants during the session. If you have any question please
raise your hand and we will answer your question privately.
The economic background and the rules of the
experiment:
Consider an industry consisting of 18 firms. Imagine you are the manager of
one of these firms and that each of the other participants manages one of the
remaining 17 firms. Each firm produces goods with a certain technology and
gets a profit of 1200 ECU for such production activity. Production, however,
results in the emission of pollution to the environment and therefore it is subject
to potential regulation by the government.
In this industry firms use different production technologies. Each of you will
be randomly assigned one particular technology. In total 5 different technologies
are available at the moment. The technologies differ in the maximum emissions
level per unit produced and therefore in the cost of reducing emissions.
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Your technology
Table 3.11 describes an example of a firm’s technology. Assume that Table
3.11 presents your firm’s technology. Note that if you do not take any abatement
measures, you will emit 20 units of pollution to the environment.





20 0 0 0
19 1 10 10
18 2 20 30
17 3 30 60
16 4 40 100
15 5 50 150
14 6 60 210
13 7 70 280
12 8 80 360
11 9 90 450
10 10 100 550
9 11 110 660
8 12 120 780
7 13 130 910
6 14 140 1050
5 15 150 1200
4 16 160 1360
3 17 170 1530
2 18 180 1710
1 19 190 1900
0 20 200 2100
Table 3.11: CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY.
The 1st column in the table present your emission level, and the 2nd column
present the corresponding emission units you abated. In this example the max-
imal amount of emission is 20 units (Note that in the experiment you can
get each of the other technologies with maximum emission levels of 18
,16 ,14 12).18
18The distribution of technologies in the industry are as follows: 4 firms each, with maximum
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The 3rd column present the Marginal abatement costs. This column answers
the question: how much it costs to reduce one unit of emission, reducing the first
unit of emission costs 10 ECU, reducing the second unit of emission unit costs
20 ECU and so on. The more units you want to reduce the higher the cost of
abating one additional unit.
The 4th column present the total abatement cost. It is the sum of the marginal
cost until your reduced unit. For example, if you want to reduce 4 units of
emission (that is, instead of emitting 20 units (your maximum emission level),
you emit 16 units) it will cost you 10 + 20 + 30 + 40=100 ECU.
emission levels of 20, 16 and 12. 3 firms each, with maximum emission level of 18 and 14.
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New technology
In addition, there is a new technology available to all firms in this industry. At
a certain point, you and the other participants will be given the possibility to
decide whether you want to pay the investment cost and adopt the new tech-
nology or continue using the conventional one. The use of the new technology
reduces your maximum emissions per unit of production (as well as the associated
abatement costs). The properties of the new technology are displayed in Table
3.12. However, if you want to adopt the new technology this will cost you a fixed
payment that will be announced later on.





7 0 0 0
6 1 10 10
5 2 20 30
4 3 30 60
3 4 40 100
2 5 50 150
1 6 60 210
0 7 70 280
Table 3.12: NEW TECHNOLOGY.
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PART I: Regulation by emission tax
In this part of the experiment the government decides to use a tax system in
order to control the emissions. This part consists of two runs (a run consists of 4
periods). Before that, a trial run will help you to understand the mechanism and
become familiar with the tax system. At the beginning of each run you and the
other participants will be randomly assigned a technology. In addition, a certain
tax per unit of emissions will be announced. This means that you have to pay a
fixed tax for every unit of emission. In each period you and the managers of the
other 17 firms, must decide simultaneously and independently in the following
sequence:
• First decision: You must decide whether you want to invest and pro-
duce using the new technology, or to use the conventional one.
If you want to adopt the new technology, you must pay a fixed amount
of 2000 ECU. Once the investment decision is done, you produce
using the new technology during the periods until the end of the
run.
• Second decision: You must decide on your emission level, or equiv-
alently, how many units you want to abate, starting from the maximal
emission level. Note that you will pay an abatement cost depending on the
units reduced and a tax proportional to your emission level.
Notice that, once you decide to invest in the new technology (the
first decision), you will produce using the new technology in the re-
maining periods of the run and you will have only have to decide about
the emissions (the second decision) in the remaining periods of the run.
Your profit at the end of each period is determined as follows:
• If you use the conventional technology, your profit in the given period
is:
1200 - (total abatement cost as in Table 3.11) - tax · (your emissions)
• If you invest in the new technology, your profit in the period of in-
vestment is:
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1200 - (your total abatement cost as in Table 3.12) - tax · (your emissions)
- 2000
• If you invested in the new technology in a previous period, your profit
in the current period (you already paid for the new technology) is:
1200 - (your total abatement cost as in Table 3.12) - tax · (your emissions)
Your profit at the end of this part is the accumulated profit obtained in one
of the (two) runs that will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment.
To improve your understanding please look at the following examples:
Example 1: Assume a tax of 30 ECU per emission unit. You decide to use the
conventional technology and then your maximum emissions are 20 units. You
decide then to abate 6 units, that is, emit 14 units. Then your profit at the
given period is:
1200− 210− 30 · 14 = 570
If you do not invest in the whole run (4 periods) and you abate 6 units in each
period, your total profit at the end of the run is:
570 · 4 = 2280
Assume that the tax is still 30 ECU and you do not invest in the new technology.
However, now you abate 3 units in the first period (that is, you emit 17 units).
Then your profit at the given period is:
1200− 60− 30 · 17 = 630
If you do not invest in the whole run (4 periods) and you abate 3 units in each
period, your total profit at the end of the run is:
630 · 4 = 2520
Example 2: Assume a tax of 43 ECU per emission unit. You decide to invest
in the new technology (then your maximum emission is 7 units) in the first
period and to abate 4 units (that is, emit 3 units). If you choose to abate 4 units
in the remaining 3 periods, your profit at the end of the run is:
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4 · [1200− (100)− 43 · 3]− 2000 = 1884
Example 3: Assume a tax of 43 ECU per emission unit. You decide to use
the conventional technology at the first period and to abate 4 units, your
Profit at the end of the first period is:
1200− (100)− 43 · 16 = 412
At the 2nd period you decide to invest in the new technology and to abate 4
units, your Profit at the end of the second period is:
1200− (100)− 43 · 3− 2000 = −1029
At the 3rd and the 4th periods you decide to abate 4 units, your Profit at the end
of the each of these periods would be:
1200− (100)− 43 · 3 = 971
Then your total Profit at the end of the run is:
412− 1029 + 971 · 2 = 1325
or, equivalently:
412 + 971 · 3− 2000 = 1325
Notice that in the experiment you may get a different technology
than in Table 3.11. Your technology will appear on the computer
screen. In addition, you will find in front of you a paper describing all
5 conventional technologies together with the new technology.
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PART II: Regulation by emission permits -
MAAC19
The government decides to use an emission permits system to control the emis-
sions. The permit system works as follows: you must hold one permit for every
unit of emissions emitted by your firm. For example, if the maximum emission
level of your technology is 20 units and you hold 10 permits, you are allowed
to emit up to 10 units and you must abate the remaining 10 units paying the
corresponding abatement cost.
The target set by the government is that the total emissions should not exceed
110 units. Therefore, at the beginning of each period the government issues 110
permits with a 1-period lifetime. This means that you can use the permits only
for 1 period. The price of the permits will be determined using an auction,
where you have the chance to buy permits from the government.
This part of the experiment lasts 3 runs. Before that, two trial periods will
help you to understand the auction mechanism and become familiar with the
emission permit’s auction procedure. Each run consists of 4 periods. At the
beginning of each run you and the other participants will be randomly assigned
a technology. In each period you and the other 17 participants, must decide
simultaneously in the following sequence:
• First decision: You must decide whether you want to invest and pro-
duce using the new technology, or to use the conventional one.
If you want to adopt the new technology you should pay a fixed amount
of 2000 ECU. Once the investment decision is done, you produce
using the new technology during the periods until the end of the
run.
• Second decision: Emission permits auction: You will have the oppor-
tunity to purchase emission permits. Recall that for every unit of
emission emitted by your firm you should purchase an emission permit
or otherwise pay the corresponding abatement cost. However, while the
abatement cost is known beforehand, the price of the permits will be
determined using an auction.
19‘MAAC’ did not appear in the original instructions.
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Notice that, once you decide to invest in the new technology (the
first decision), you will produce using the new technology in the re-
maining periods of the run and you will have only have to decide about
the emissions (the second decision) in the remaining periods of the run.
Your payoff at the end of each period is determined as follows:
• If you use the conventional technology, your profit at the given period
is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.11]) - permit price · (number of
permits purchased).
• If you invest in the new technology, your profit at the period of in-
vestment is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.12]) - permit price · (number of
permits purchased) - 2000.
• If you invested in the new technology in a previous period, your profit
at the current period (you already paid for the new technology) is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.12]) - permit price · (number of
permits purchased)
The auction procedure is explained on the next page.
Your profit at the end of this part is the accumulated profit obtained in one
of the (three) runs that will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment.
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The emission permits auction
Recall that the government issues every period a total of 110 emission permits
to the whole industry. In each period, you can purchase emission permits in an
auction.
Each auction will take place in several rounds using the following procedure:
• A permit price of 5 ECU is announced.
• You and the other participants, will be required to simultaneously introduce
your permit demand, that is, the number of permits you are willing to
purchase at this price. Note that you cannot purchase more certificates
than you need (your maximum level of emission).
• The total demand of permits (the aggregate number of permits that the
firms want to purchase) will be then computed. If the sum of the individual
demands is:
– equal or lower than 110 (the number of permits issued by the regula-
tor): the auction ends and you are assigned your demanded permits
paying this price per unit demanded.
– higher than 110: The permit price will be increased by 10 ECU and a
new auction round will start.
You have 40 seconds to introduce your permits’ demand. If no demand is in-
troduced by 40 seconds, the system will take your demand for the previous price.
If you did not introduce your demand at initial price (5 ECU), the system would
consider your demand equal to your maximum emission level!
To improve your understanding please look at the following examples:
Example 1: Assume you decided to use the conventional technology. The
auction stops with a price of 55 ECU per permit and you have demanded 14
permits at this price. Then your profit at this period is:
1200− 210− 55 · 14 = 220
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Example 2: Assume you decided to use the conventional technology. The
auction stops with a price of 55 ECU per permit and you have demanded 15
permits at this price. Then your profit at this period is:
1200− 150− 55 · 15 = 225
Example 3: Assume you decided to invest in this period in the new tech-
nology. The auction stops with a price of 65 ECU per permit and you have
demanded 1 permits at this price. Then your profit at this period is:
1200− 210− 65 · 1− 2000 = −1075
Example 4: Assume you invested in a previous period in the new tech-
nology. The auction stops with a price of 55 ECU per permit and you have
demanded 2 permits at this price. Then your profit at this period is:
1200− 150− 55 · 2 = 940
We will now play 2 trial auction periods so you can become familiar with the
auction procedure. If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will
assist you.
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PART II: Regulation by Emission Permits -
MGDA20
The government decides to use an emission permits system to control the emis-
sions. The permit system works as follows: you must hold one permit for every
unit of emission emitted by your firm. For example, if the maximum emission
level of your technology is 20 units and you hold 10 permits, you are allowed
to emit up to 10 units and you must abate the remaining 10 units paying the
corresponding abatement cost.
The target set by the government is that the total emissions should not exceed
108 units. Therefore, at the beginning of each period the government issues 108
permits with a 1-period lifetime. This means that you can use the permits only
for 1 period. Every period you will get an initial amount of permits (depending
on the technology that was assigned to you) and you can sell to or buy permits
from the other firms in the market using an auction.
This part of the experiment lasts 3 runs. Before that, two trial periods will
help you understand the mechanism and become familiar with the emission per-
mit’s auction procedure. Each run consists of 4 periods. At the beginning of
each run you and the other participants will be randomly assigned a technology.
In each period you and the other 17 firms, must decide simultaneously in the
following sequence:
• First decision: You must decide whether you want to invest and pro-
duce using the new technology, or to use the conventional one.
If you want to adopt the new technology you should pay a fixed amount
of 2000 ECU. Once the investment decision is done, you produce
using the new technology during the periods until the end of the
run.
• Second decision: Emission permits auction: You will have the opportu-
nity to buy and/or sell emission permits. Recall that for every unit
of emission emitted by your firm you should purchase an emission permit
or pay the corresponding abatement cost. However, while the abatement
cost is known beforehand, the price of the permits will be determined
20‘MGDA’ did not appear in the original instructions.
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using an auction.
Notice that, once you decide to invest in the new technology (the
first decision), you will produce using the new technology in the re-
maining periods of the run and you will have only have to decide about
the emissions (the second decision) in the remaining periods of the run.
Your payoff at the end of each period is determined as follows:
• If you use the conventional technology, your profit at the given period
is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.11]) + auction profit.
• If you invest in the new technology, your profit at the period of in-
vestment is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.12]) + auction profit - 2000.
• If you invested in the new technology in a previous period, your profit
at the current period (you already paid for the new technology) is:
1200 - (total abatement cost [Table 3.12]) + auction profit
Auction Profit = Your total earnings in ECU from selling permits - Your
total expenditure in ECU from buying permits (For instance, if you sell one per-
mit in 60 ECU and one permit in 110 ECU then your total auction profit is: 60
+ 110 = 170 ECU)
The auction procedure is explained on the next page.
Your profit at the end of this part is the accumulated profit obtained in one
of the (three) runs that will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment.
88
3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
The emission permits auction
Recall that the government issues every period a total of 108 emission permits
to the whole industry. In each period, you will be assigned an initial amount of
permits (depending on your technology). During a period of 3 minutes you,
and the other participants, are free to sell and/or buy emission permits in the
market.
How can I buy 1 emission permit? If you want to buy an emission permit
you have two options:
• Submit a bid by entering at which price you are willing to buy 1
emission permit. Each auction round is for one permit, when that
permit is bought you can buy one more permit. Note that if you did
not buy the last permit, your bid is still pending for the next round
(the next unit auctioned).
• Accept the lowest offer (the computer will choose automatically the
lowest offer).
How can I sell 1 emission permit? If you want to sell an emission permit
you have two options:
• Submit an offer by entering at which price you are willing to sell 1
emission permit. Note that you can only sell the amount of permits
you own. Each auction round is for one permit, when that permit is
sold out you can sell one more permit. Note that if you did not sell
the last permit, your offer is still pending for the next round (the next
unit auctioned).
• Accept the highest bid (the computer will choose automatically the
highest bid).
During these 3 minutes you are free to buy and sell as many permits as you
want. Recall that once the market closes, you should abate those emission units
that exceed the number of emission permits that you hold at the end of the auc-
tion.
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To improve your understanding please look at the following examples:
Example 1: Assume you decided to use the conventional technology (you
got an initial allocation of 8 permits) You bought one unit at the price of 65, one
unit at the price of 75 and 5 units at the price of 55. Then your profit at this
period is:
1200− 415− 150 = 635
Example 2: Assume you decided to invest in this period in the new tech-
nology (you got an initial allocation of 8 permits). You soled one unit at the
price of 65, one unit at the price of 75 and 3 units at the price of 55. Then your
profit at this period is:
1200 + 305− 100− 2000 = −595
Example 3: Assume you invested in a previous period in the new technology
(you got an initial allocation of 8 permits). You soled one unit at the price of 65,
one unit at the price of 75 and 3 units at the price of 55. Then your profit at
this period is:
1200 + 305− 100 = 1405
We will now play 2 trial auction periods so you can become familiar with the
auction procedure. If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will
assist you.
90
3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.6.3 Screens
Figure 3.5: The single-period tax treatment: The ‘investment screen’ in each
period.
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Figure 3.6: The single-period tax treatment: The ‘abatement screen’ in each
period.
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Figure 3.7: The single-period tax treatment: The ‘results screen’ after each pe-
riod.
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Figure 3.8: The SGDA treatment: The ‘investment screen’ in each period.
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Figure 3.9: The SGDA treatment: The ‘auction screen’ in each period.
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Figure 3.10: The SGDA treatment: The ‘results screen’ after each period.
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Figure 3.11: The SAAC treatment: The ‘investment screen’ in each period.
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Figure 3.12: The SAAC treatment: The ‘auction screen’ in each period.
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Figure 3.13: The SAAC treatment: The ‘results screen’ after each period.
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Figure 3.14: The SGAC treatment: The ‘investment screen’ in each period.
100
3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure 3.15: The SGAC treatment: The ‘auction screen’ in each period.
101
3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure 3.16: The SGAC treatment: The ‘results screen’ after each period.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Evidence from the Kiel
Market for Budget Travel by
Train
4.1 Introduction
Since it was introduced by Gu¨th et al. (1982), the ultimatum bargaining game
(UG)1 serves as a prominent and consistent example of a situation where the
observed behavior deviates significantly from the game theoretical prediction.2
There is, however, criticism whether UG indeed describes a real world phe-
nomenon (see Grace & Kemp, 2005, p.824). This motivates the search for
real-world situations having an UG structure. This note investigates a unique
market which shares certain features with the UG. Thus, we provide an investi-
gation of a market which have some features of the UG in a naturally occurring
environment. Moreover, the stakes in this naturally occurring situation are quite
1The ultimatum bargaining game is a sequential game where Player A divides a pie of size
x between himself and another Player B. Player B, then, decides whether to accept and receive
the division made by Player A or to reject the division. If Player B rejects, both players receive
zero.
2The subgame perfect equilibrium prediction for the UG is that the proposer will receive
virtually all of the pie to be divided, while the responder will receive at most the smallest
monetary unit in which proposals can be made. However, the results of laboratory experiments
of the UG are that responders receive a much larger portion of the pie (close to half of the pie).
See Roth (1995) for a review.
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moderate, thus, comparable to standard laboratory experiments.
The introduction of the Schleswig-Holstein ticket (S-H ticket)3 by the German
train company (Deutsche Bahn) created a market for budget travel by train. The
S-H ticket allows up to five people to travel together for a fixed price in regional
trains within two federal states in northern Germany. Due to the feature that
only a single passenger who rides with the S-H ticket can continue using it after
separating from the others4, it is worthwhile for some passengers (for instance,
passengers who need to use the tickets later) to buy the S-H ticket and offer to take
others with their ticket for a specified price.5 Thus, a market for budget travel
by train emerges. This market is characterized, not by spontaneous gatherings
of passengers who want to share the cost of traveling, as one could expect, but
rather by ‘proposers’ who offer to take ‘responders’ with their ticket. This note
aims at describing and characterizing the market which we refer to as the Kiel
market for budget travel by train (to Hamburg).
The note is organized as follows: The next section describes the Kiel market
for budget travel by train. Section 4.3 describes the ‘ride-share community’,
an alternative market for budget travel by car in Germany. In section 4.4, we
investigate responders’ behavior in the Kiel market for budget travel by train
by means of a natural field experiment. Finally, section 4.5 provides a short
discussion.
4.2 The Kiel Market for Budget Travel by Train
The S-H ticket was issued by the Deutsche Bahn in June 2001. It allows up to five
people to ride together for a fixed price in regional trains within the federal states
of Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern6, be-
3The S-H ticket is a ’land ticket’, a ticket that allows one to travel in regional trains within
a federal state (sometimes two federal states) in Germany for nearly an entire day. Another
popular discount group ticket is the ‘weekend ticket’ which allows one to travel in regional trains
all over Germany for a fixed amount on Saturdays and Sundays.
4One passenger has to write his name on the ticket. Therefore, that passenger can continue
using the ticket after separating from the others.
5This creates an ‘arbitrage’ opportunity. A person can buy a ticket and use it to travel
the entire day, taking passengers with him, and actually work as a ‘carrier’, but this rarely
happened. Only 3/133 ≈ 2% of the offers were made by possible professional ‘carriers’.
6Additionally, The S-H ticket allows the use of the public transportation in Hamburg.
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tween 09:00 and 03:00 during the week and 03:00 and 03:00 on weekends. The
attractiveness of the tickets depends on the origin-destination distance. The
ticket is especially attractive when the destination station is, on the one hand,
sufficiently close to the origin station so that the potential passengers are trav-
eling with the regional trains7, and when, on the other hand, the destination
station is far enough from the origin station so that the alternative cost (the cost
of buying a single ticket) is high. Two additional conditions are needed for a
well-established market for budget travel by train to emerge: A sufficiently large
volume of passengers from the origin station to a common destination, and a
known meeting point where passengers can bargain. In other words, it is possible
to form a market for budget travel by train only when the demand for budget
travel is sufficiently high and where it is possible to establish a meeting point for
the market to take place.
These conditions are met in Kiel, a city of 233,701 inhabitants8, which is
located 97 kilometers north of Hamburg, Germany. Every route (by train) to
any other major German city passes through Hamburg, and the usual fare to
Hamburg is that of the regional trains. A single fare from Kiel to Hamburg (or
from Hamburg to Kiel) costs e19.20, or e14.40 if one holds a train discount
card (Bahncard).9 Consequently, the high demand for budget travel by train to
Hamburg, together with the fact that there are passengers who make a round trip,
create a market for budget travel by train which is operating near the automatic
ticket machines in the main train station of Kiel. There are mainly two types
of agents in the market, ‘proposers’ and ‘responders’. The proposers (usually
passengers who make a round trip) offer to take responders with their tickets for
a specified price (a price which is independent of the number of passengers). We
did not observe discrimination between responders (all passengers pay the same
price).10 The responders accept or reject the offer (they can also try to negotiate
but that rarely occurs).
Note that this market is not fully legal. One is not allowed to change the group
7For long distances, the Inter City (IC) or the Inter City Express (ICE) trains are mainly
used.
8According to Kiel statistics report Nr. 193. (31.12.2007)
9If one is caught without a ticket in the train he has to pay a fee of e40.
10Maybe the reason for the absence of price discrimination between responders is that the
payment is usually done in the train. It may be difficult for a proposer to explain a passenger
why he pays more than the others.
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size or the members of the group after the first use of the ticket. Nevertheless,
many of the proposers had bought the S-H ticket in Hamburg traveled with it to
Kiel, and after finishing their business in Kiel, they then offer to take passengers
with their ticket (back) to Hamburg. Yet, as the data clearly show, a stable
market is operating, in front of the Deutsche Bahn information desk, without
disturbance from the authorities.
4.2.1 Data
During May-June 2008 we observed the market in the main train station of Kiel
on weekdays from Monday until Thursday (a total of 19 different days) for a total
of four train departures to Hamburg at 16:21, 17:21, 18:21, and 19:21. We chose
to observe the market in the afternoon of normal weekdays mainly due to two
reasons: First, in a market with many proposers and responders (as on Fridays
or weekends) it may not be feasible to document all offers. Second, we planned
to enter the market as proposers, at a later stage, and offer higher prices than
usually observed. This may only be possible with few proposers in the market.
On each day, we arrived at the meeting point close to the automatic ticket
machines at 15:50 (half an hour before the train of 16:21 departs) and stayed there
until 19:21, documenting the arrival and departure of proposers, their gender, and
the prices offered. Table 4.1 presents the major characteristics of the market.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the distribution of prices in the market and the
average number of proposers and prices according to the train departure time,
respectively.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% of male proposers 68.05 - - -
% of proposers older than 40 years 4.13 - - -
% of cost-sharing offers 8.27 - - -
% of offers in the last 10 minutes 51.61 - - -
Proposer’s Price (e) 5.91 0.76 3 10
Passengers per proposer 3.25 1.17 0 4
Waiting time per proposer (minutes) 14.13 6.53 1 28
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the Kiel market for budget travel by train. A
total of 145 proposers were observed in 19 different days (Monday-Thursday) in
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of prices in the Kiel market for budget travel by train
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Figure 4.2: Average number of proposers, and average prices according to depar-
ture time
Table 4.1 indicates that 68% of the proposers are males, less than 5% of the
proposers are (looking) older than 40 years, and 8% of the offers in the market
were not strictly offers to take responders for a specified price (we denote these
offers as ‘cost-sharing offers’). Each proposer waits on average 14 minutes in the
market, offers to take responders for an average price of e5.91, and travels with
an average number of 3.2 passengers. Two prominent features regarding the price
offers are that all offers (132/133 ≈ 99%) were of integer prices, and that most
price offers (121/133 ≈ 91%) were either e5 or e6. Another remarkable feature
is that 47% of the proposers who get less than four passengers leave the market
more than 10 minutes before the train departure. This means that almost half of
these proposers do not act as maximizers by exhausting the time until departure.
This feature is particularly puzzling, since the existence of deadline strengthens
the proposers’ bargaining power. Nevertheless, we have to take into account that
staying in the market until right before departure incurs the cost of getting an
uncomfortable seat in the train. Table 4.2 presents the average time proposers
arrive and depart from the market.
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Train Average number Average number Average time Average time
departure of proposers of passengers proposers arrive proposers depart
16:21:00 2.21 3.5 15:57:27 16:11:55
17:21:00 2.23 2.79 16:55:25 17:09:49
18:21:00 1.58 3.44 17:58:30 18:14:09
19:21:00 1.86 3.32 18:55:25 19:06:49
Table 4.2: Proposers arrival and departure average time
Given the prices observed in the market (together with eight observations with
a price of e8 and nine observation with a price of e10 that we offered ourselves,
playing the role of proposers) and the corresponding number of passengers joining
the proposers at each price, we can draw the demand schedule per S-H ticket.
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Figure 4.3: The observed demand: Average number of passengers per price offered
The positive slope of the demand schedule, in Figure 4.3, in the price range
5-6, can be attributed to the finite sample size (121 observations of prices 5 and
6).11 In any case, Figure 4.3 indicates that the demand is largely inelastic at this
price range. It seems that when a proposer offers a price of e7 (or lower), he can
take about three to four passengers (the arc elasticity of demand between each
of two nearby prices (5,6,7) is inelastic (|Ed| < 1)). However, when a proposer
11To see whether the positive slope in the price 5-6 is substantial or due to the finite sample
size, we further collected eight observations, acting as proposers in the market. We have taken
with us on average 3.875 passengers per time, thus, supporting the finite sample explanation.
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offers a price of e8 (or e10), he can get about one passenger (the arc elasticity
of demand between the prices of 8 and 10 is also inelastic). It is obvious from
Figure 4.3 that the revenue-maximizing price is e7. Formally, using a Flinger
and Policello Robust Rank Order test (F-P test), we find that the revenue of
proposers who charged e7 is significantly larger than the revenue of proposers
who charged any other observed price (3,5,6,8 or 10).12
Finally, the prices and average waiting time according to the proposers’ gen-
der are presented in Table 4.3. The series of prices and waiting time are not
significantly different from each other at the 10% level.
Price Waiting time
Male proposers 5.98 (0.68) 13.98 (7.01)
Female proposers 5.93 (0.76) 14.32 (6.09)
Table 4.3: Average price and waiting time of male and female proposers in the
Kiel market for budget travel by train (std. dev is given in brackets)
4.2.2 Characterization of the market
This section provides a qualitative analysis of the market. On the one hand, the
market for budget travel by train is a market situation where prices are expected
to be largely influence by the supply and demand. On the other hand, as provided
below in section 4.3, we find that the deadline imposed on the bargainers indeed
leads to higher prices than in a situation without a deadline (section 4.3 provides
evidence that the average price of a travel using the S-H ticket is cheaper when
the responder contact the proposer in advanced). That evidence supports that
the market can be characterized, at least to some extent, as an UG.
We start our analysis with a comparison between the the Kiel market for bud-
get travel by train and the UG: In the classic UG the ultimatum stems from the
strategy space of the responder (accept or reject). In the train market, however,
it stems from the deadline imposed on the bargainers by the trains’ departure
time. The idea that the existence of a deadline would turn even an unstructured
bargaining game into an ultimatum bargaining game was already tested in the
12P < 0.05 between the revenue’s series with a price of e7 and each of the other series of
revenues.
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laboratory in the reverse ultimatum game by Gneezy et al. (2003).13 In contrast
to laboratory experiments of the UG, the bargaining in the train station is done
face-to-face. Nevertheless, it is sensible to assume that during the time of obser-
vations (Monday-Thursday, 15:50-19:21) proposers do not meet the responders
frequently. The fact that proposers are observed by other people may decrease
their price offers to responders. Haley & Fessler (2005) found that when a draw-
ing of a pair of eyes is shown on the screen in a dictator bargaining game14, it
increases positive giving by the proposers from 55% to 88%. The natural con-
text in the train market (in comparison to the UG) may increase the price offers,
since Hoffman et al. (1996) find that offers in UG decrease significantly when
property rights are established (Hoffman et al. (1996) used a knowledge quiz to
select ”sellers” and ”buyers”). A comparison with the classic UG experiment is
given in Table 4.4.
13The reverse ultimatum game involves two players. Player A divides a pie of size x between
himself and another Player B. Player B, then, decides whether to accept and receive the division
proposed by Player A, or to reject the offer. If Player B rejects the offer, Player A can either
offer another division, as long as that offer gives Player B a strictly higher share of the pie, or
refuse to offer and end the game. In this last case both players receive zero. Thus, the game
ends either when Player B accepts an offer, or when, following a rejection, Player A refuses to
make another offer.
14The dictator bargaining game involves two players. Players A divides a pie of size x
between himself and another Player B.
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UG Train
Type of agents Only proposers Mainly Proposers
and responders and responders
Number of responders One Many
per proposer
Competition No To some extent
between proposers
Actions Proposers offer, Theoretically can also
responders can bargain
accept or reject
Visual contact No Face-to-face
Repeated game No Kiel is large,
also depends on
time of the day
Ultimatum Accept or reject Time to departure
(51% of proposers left
less than 10 min.
to departure)
Context Artificial Natural
Money amount Mostly small Relatively small
(gain about 5-10$) (save about 5-20$)
Table 4.4: A comparison between the Ultimatum Game (UG) and the Kiel market
for budget travel by train
The question in whether we describe a market situation or a kind of an UG,
is best illustrated using the following Although there are similarities between the
UG and the Kiel market, we are, nevertheless, dealing with a market situation.
That means that the price offers are bounded by a certain range. We have
not observed a price above e10 (or below e3). That may imply that competition
between proposers prevents proposers to offer prices above e10.15 The lower
bound on the price offers may be determined by the minimum revenue a proposer
seeks, otherwise, he would act as a responder. Nevertheless, competition is not
intense when prices are below e1016, as presented in Figure 4.4.
15When we were acting as proposers in the market (see section 4.4), we could not enter the
market with a price higher than e10 in the presence of other proposers because responders were
looking for a better offer.
16When a proposer offers to take a responder for a specified price, other proposers do not,
usually, reveal their prices even when they are lower than the price offered (maybe due to an
unwritten behavior code).
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(b) Offers with competition
Figure 4.4: Figure 4.4(a) presents the distribution of price offers in the market
when there is only one proposer in the market. Figure 4.4(b) presents the distri-
bution of price offers in the market when there are, at least, two proposers in the
market.
Formally, using an F-P test for comparison between the series of prices when
there is one proposer (no competition) in the market and when there are at least
two proposers (competition), we find no significant difference (P = 0.36) between
the series.
4.3 The Ride-Share Community
A large market for budget travel by car in Germany is the online ‘ride-share
community’ (http://www.mitfahrgelegenheit.de/). The web-site allows proposers
to post offers to take passengers in a certain route (e.g. Kiel-Hamburg), at a
certain date, for a certain price. Thus, the web-site provides a list of names and
prices for each route and date (see Figure 4.9 in the Appendix), so that responders
can look for an offer. Although the offered price could depend on the number
of passengers, it is almost always a specified price that does not depend on the
number of passengers (794/812 ≈ 98% of the offers in the Kiel-Hamburg route).17
A responder can either accept the offer and contact the proposer, or reject and
search for another offer. There are, on average, more than one proposer per
hour, and since responders contact proposers in advance this market entails no
ultimatum. We observed the market for a period of 5 weeks (Monday-Thursday)
between May, 5, 2008 and June, 5, 2008 (a total of 812 offers, 68% are made
17Only 64% of the proposers post their price in the web-site. However, we called the other
36% to see whether their prices depend on the number of passengers.
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by males). The distribution of price offers in this market (in comparison with
the Kiel market for budget travel by train) is presented in Figure 4.5, while the











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Price
Mitfahrgelegenheit.de Kiel train station
Figure 4.5: Distribution of prices in the ride-share community and in the Kiel
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Figure 4.6: Average number of proposers, and average price per hour in the
ride-share community
From Figure 4.5 we learn that the price of e5 is the most common offer
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(average price: 5.25, std. dev: 0.57, min price: 4, max price: 12). This price
is lower than in the market for budget travel by train18, possibly due to more
competition (more proposers per hour), or due to the absence of ultimatum in
the ride-share community. Moreover, the marginal cost of taking a passenger is
unknown to us. If a proposer only cares about monetary gains, then under the
assumption that the proposer has to drive anyway, his marginal cost is about zero.
Some people, however, get negative (or positive) utility from having someone else
in the car. Thus, in order to learn about the price offers in the market, we made
a short survey, calling a total of 30 proposers and asking them why they charge
the price offered. Of those 30 proposers, 19 (63%) offered a price of e5, 8 (26%)
offered a price of e6, 2 (6%) offered a price of e4, and one proposer (3%) offered a
price of e7.19 13 proposers (43%) decide by looking at other offers in the web-site
(proposers who offered e5 and e6). 12 proposers (40%) stated that they charge a
price that covers their costs of gasoline (proposers who offered e4,5 and e6). The
two proposers who charge e4 behave as in a price (a´ la Bertrand) competition
(by charging that price they manage to take 4 passengers each ride). 4 proposers
(13%) used the terms “fair” or “reasonable”.
The ‘ride-share community’ web-site also allows proposers to post offers to
travel using the S-H ticket. We observed 41 offers (4% of the total number of
offers) to travel using the S-H ticket. 20 offers (48%) did not specify a price (cost-
sharing offers). Of the other 52% that did specify a price, we count 16 offers of
e5, and 5 offers of e6 (the average price offered is e5.23). These prices are
significantly smaller than the prices observed in the train station (P = 0.00, two
sided F-P test), but not different from the distribution of prices in the ride-share
community (P = 0.53, two sided F-P test).
18Using an F-P test, comparing between the series of prices in the Kiel train station and in
the ride-share community, we find that the series of prices are significantly different from each
other (P = 0.00).
19His answer to our question was something like: “That’s the way it is”.
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4.4 An Experimental Test of Responder Behav-
ior
So far, we have passively observed the Kiel market for budget travel by train.20
We have learned that the prevailing price in the market is e6. Moreover, 91% of
the price offers were of e5 or e6. In order to get some insights about responders’
behavior to different price offers, we entered the market as proposers. Initially, we
aimed at revealing the observed demand for travel using the S-H ticket for prices
higher than e7. For this purpose we employed four research assistants (three fe-
males and one male) to behave as proposers in the market. They documented the
time they offered and the gender of the responders. The experimental procedure
was as follows: The research assistants bought the S-H ticket immediately upon
arriving at the train station. They offered to take responders for a specified price
on the same days and hours as described in section 4.2 (Mo-Thu, 15:50-19:21).
To motivate them to approach as many responders as possible, the research as-
sistants could keep the money they have earned as proposers in addition to their
hourly salary. They did not provide information about the experiment to the
responders at any point. The responders could only know that the proposer is
traveling to Hamburg and would come back later using the S-H ticket. In to-
tal, our research assistants entered the market as proposers during 35 different
days, between June, 2008 and October, 2008. On each day they offered to take
responders for a specified price. The number of days per price is given in Table
4.5.
Number of days per price 6 7 6 5 2 4 1 4
Price offered 8 10 12 13 14 15 17 18
Table 4.5: Number of different days for each price
Although we initially aimed at revealing the demand for travel using the S-H
ticket, we could not compare the results of prices higher than e10 with the results
of lower prices. The reason is that with prices higher than e10, we could only
enter the market in the absence of other proposers. This is because at high prices
20In fact, we used the data we generated (by behaving as proposers in the market and offering
to take responders with our ticket for e8 and e10) to create the demand schedule presented in
Figure 4.3.
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responders are looking for a better offer. Therefore, for prices higher than e10,
we only aimed at finding the price where the demand is equal to zero (i.e. no
passenger is willing to come with us). Although the prevailing price in the market
is e6, only at the price of e18 we did not find a single responder to join us. This
means that, at least, some responders behave as profit maximizers as economic
theory predicts.
Although our offers at these high prices are not completely comparable with
each other we, nevertheless, used two measures to assess the effect of price on
the number of passengers. (i) The percentage of days we traveled to Hamburg
at each price (i.e. days we found, at least, one passenger who was willing to pay
the specified price). (ii) The rejection rate of offers at each price. The results are
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(b) Percentage of rejection of offers per
price offered
Figure 4.7: Figure 4.7(a) displays the percentage of days we found, at least, one
responder who was willing to travel with us to Hamburg at the price offered.
Figure 4.7(b) displays the rejection rates (number of rejection divide by the total
number of offers) at the price offered.
Figure 4.7 illustrates that when the price increases, the percentage of travels
decreases monotonically and the rejection rate increases monotonically. Finally,
we estimated a Logit model, to see whether the price, time pressure, and the
difference in gender of proposers and responders affect the probability that a
responder will accept an offer.21 The results are presented in Table 4.6.
21In an additional Logit estimation we find that responder’s gender is not significantly cor-
related with the probability to accept an offer.
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LR test (K-1) 23.36***
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.16
*, **, *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Table 4.6: Logit estimation testing whether the probability to accept an offer is
correlated with the price, the gender interaction (dummy variable gets the value 1
when the genders of a proposer and a responder are different), and a time pressure
(dummy variable gets the value 1 when offer was made less than 10 minutes to
the train departure)
Table 4.6 indicates that, as expected, the probability to accept an offer is
lower when the price offered is higher. In addition, the probability to accept an
offer is higher when the offer is made right before the train departure time. This
result is in line with Gneezy et al. (2003). They find that most agreements, in a
reverse ultimatum game, occur just before the time limit expires.
4.5 Discussion
This note describes the Kiel market for budget travel by train. There are several
reasons for investigating this market. It provides, to some extent, a natural
investigation of an ultimatum bargaining situation. This market also allows the
investigation of the behavior of bargainers in a situation restricted by a deadline.
We find that offers are lower than the profit-maximization price. In addition,
a large portion of the proposers who did not get four passengers leave the market
long before the train departure time, thus, not behaving as profit-maximizers.
The result that the distribution of prices is similar when there is only one proposer
in the market and when there are, at least, two proposers may imply that the
market price of e6 is used as a coordination device (focal-point). In other words,
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when a price of e6 prevails in the market and it is common knowledge, responders
expect proposers to offer that price, and proposers expect responders to accept
that price offer. The focal-point explanation was also suggested by Gu¨th et al.
(2001) to explain the large portion of people who choose equal-split in an UG
experiment. Finally, taking the role of proposers, only at the price of e18 we
could not find any responder to travel with us. This means that, at least, some
responders behave as profit maximizers.
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4.6 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.6.1 Screens
Figure 4.8: The opening page at http://www.mitfahrgelegenheit.de/
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Figure 4.9: List of offers at http://www.mitfahrgelegenheit.de/
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This section briefly summarizes the results of chapters 1 to 4. The first two
chapters of this thesis deal with the issue of subject pool selection in Cournot
Oligopoly experiments. Chapter 1 is motivated by the general question in whether
it is justifiable to ignore personality traits of subjects playing the role of firms (or
firms’ managers) in laboratory experiments. The main objective of this chapter is
to test whether personality traits (as measured by the NEO-PI-R) affect behavior
in a random-matching Cournot Duopoly experiment. We find that in the absence
of experience (in the first period of the experiment) high conscientiousness (and
female sex) is correlated with collusion. However, from the second period of the
experiment onwards, personality traits do not affect the subjects’ behavior. In
view of the personality-situation controversy, this result supports situation as a
main determinant of behavior (at least in the specific situation tested). This
study also finds that a larger cooperation ratio (the ratio between the collusive
and the Cournot-Nash profits) and, as a result, a larger vulnerability ratio (the
ratio between the Cournot-Nash profit and the profit a player receives when
choosing the cooperative action while the other player deviates) does not yield
more collusion than in previous studies. In fact, we observed higher frequency of
quantities within the rivalistic range than in previous studies.
Chapter 2 presents a study that follows the design of Huck et al. (2004)
to investigate whether Malaysian managers behave differently than Malaysian
students (and German students) in a Cournot Triopoly experiment. By and
large, we find that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a good predictor for subject
performance in Cournot Triopoly experiments (at least, the quantities selected
by the three subject pools are closer to the Nash quantity than to the other
two benchmark quantities). Albeit, we find that Malaysian students perform
significantly more competitively than the Malaysian managers and the German
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students. This result casts doubts upon one aspect of external validity in Cournot
Oligopoly experiments, namely, the extent to which we can generalize results
of experiments conducted with students to the behavior of managers in such
situations. In addition, we find that gender affects behavior: For the German
student sample we find that females behave more cooperatively than males, while
the opposite holds for the Malaysian samples. This result supports findings by
Gneezy et al. (2009, forthcoming) suggesting that societal structure is crucially
linked to observed gender differences in behavior.
Chapter 3 provides a direct test in the laboratory for the theoretical prediction
by Requate & Unhold (2001) that when the regulator commits herself ex-ante to
the level of permits, the initial allocation of permits (auctioning vs. grandfa-
thering), or the specific auction design (in our case, an ascending clock auction
vs. a single unit double auction), should not affect the firms’ incentives to invest
in advanced technology in a market characterized by many small asymmetric
firms. In particular, we center on three allocation-auction policies: auctioning
off permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits and al-
locating them through a single unit double auction, and grandfathering permits
and allocating them through an ascending clock auction. The results confirm the
theoretical findings of Requate & Unhold (2001) that regarding optimal adoption
of the advanced technology, all three policies are equivalent. We also find that
these policies yield, similar results regarding total social welfare. We find, how-
ever, weak evidence that the single unit double auction is more efficient than the
ascending clock auction in the optimal allocation of permits (having lower total
abatement costs given the investment decision).
Chapter 4 describes the Kiel market for budget travel by train, thus, providing
a natural investigation of a market situation having some features of the ultima-
tum bargaining game. We find that offers are lower than the profit-maximization
price. In addition, a large portion of the proposers who did not get the maximum
number of passengers leave the market long before the train departure time, thus,
not behaving as profit-maximizers. The result that the distribution of prices is
similar when there is only one proposer in the market and when there are, at
least, two proposers may imply that the market price of e6 is used as a coordi-
nation device (focal-point). Finally, taking the role of proposers, we find that, at
least, some responders behave as profit maximizers.
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Lastly, Appendix A presents a bootstrap approach to determine critical values
for the DQ-test (Engle & Manganelli, 2004b). It is shown to have preferable
empirical size features than the asymptotic approximation of the test in finite
samples. It is also preferable to a likelihood ratio test based on Logit regressions
(Clements & Taylor, 2003; Patton, 2006).
In summary, although the emergence of experimental economics dates back to
the second half of the previous century, it has especially started booming in the
last two decades. Nowadays, experiments are being used in almost every field of
economics. Nevertheless there is still much to learn from experiments, especially
in the topics presented in this thesis. Although experiments on Cournot Oligopoly
have been conducted since the late 1950’s (Hoggatt; Selten & Sauermann), there
is no consensus about the optimal design for such experiments, especially regard-
ing the following questions: Which information should be given to subjects and
how should this information be presented? Which subject pool best represents
firms? How many subjects should represents a single firm? Should we allow com-
munication between subjects during the experiment? Only by testing the effect
of different parameters in the experimental design (e.g. communication vs. no
communication, number of subjects assigned to one firm, etc.), may we come out
with a design that genuinely describes the Cournot Oligopoly market structure.
Relating to chapter 3, although much experimental research has been done in
the topic of permit markets, the vast majority of this research focuses on the
static efficiency of the different policy instruments, and only few studies consid-
ered the dynamic efficiency of development or adoption of advanced technology.
This is the case even though theorists started ranking environmental policy in-
struments according to their ability to facilitate adoption and development of
advanced technology, more than two decades ago, around the second half of the
1980’s (Downing & White; Malueg; Milliman & Prince). Thus, further research
focusing on the incentives to adopt and develop advanced technologies in pollu-
tion markets is required in order to provide feedback for the theories. Finally, the
importance of field experiments to economic research should not only be mea-
sured by their direct contribution from the published works22, but also by their
indirect contribution owing to the process of searching for naturally occurring sit-
22For a discussion about the merits and contributions of field experiments to economic re-
search see List (2006).
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uations that could be better understood by means of an experiment. This search




A Bootstrap Approach to
Value-at-Risk Diagnostics
A.1 Introduction
Value-at-risk (VaR) is a widely used measure of portfolio risk. Formally, suppose
that {yt}Tt=1 is a time series of speculative returns. At coverage rate α and given
the information set available in time t − 1, Ωt−1, the conditional VaR, denoted
VaRt(α), is the quantile such that
Prob[yt < −VaRt(α)|Ωt−1] = α. (A.1)
Although the VaR concept is easy to grasp, its calculation is challenging
since the ‘true’ conditional distribution of returns is typically unknown.1 To
evaluate competing specifications, Christoffersen (1998) suggests a framework
for testing VaR models that focuses on two conditions, unconditional coverage
and independence. While the former implies that the frequency of actual return
shortfalls, so-called VaR hits equals α, the latter states that the event of a return
shortfall in period t is uncorrelated with information available in Ωt−1. Engle
1For a review on the numerous VaR models see Engle & Manganelli (2004a).
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& Manganelli (2004b) propose a regression based Dynamic Quantile (DQ) test
linking current to past violations.
The fact that the DQ approach exploits a common linear regression for bi-
nary dependent variables provoked competing VaR diagnostics based on logit
regressions (Clements & Taylor, 2003, and Patton, 2006). Depending on the
nominal VaR coverage α, the postulated asymptotic distribution of the DQ-test
might work only for very large sample size. Then, resampling techniques could
be considered as a promising alternative to achieve faster convergence of actual
to nominal significance levels. In this study we propose a bootstrap design for the
implementation of the DQ-test which is similar to a resampling approach recently
introduced by Herwartz & Xu (2009). A Monte Carlo study shows that in finite
samples the bootstrap outperforms inference based on critical values taken from
a χ2-distribution.
In the next section we sketch the DQ-test and the logit based likelihood ratio
(LR) test. The bootstrap procedure is also sketched in Section A.2. A Monte
Carlo comparison of alternative inferential strategies is provided in Section A.3.
Section A.4 concludes.
A.2 VaR Diagnosis
To derive the DQ-test, define a process of centered hits,
zt(α) = I(yt < −VaRt(α)|Ωt−1)− α, (A.2)
where I(•) is an indicator function. Hence, for a well specified VaR model, un-
conditionally, the hit function is 1−α with probability α and −α with probability
1 − α. To assess dynamic accuracy, consider the following linear regression for
given presample values
zt(α) = β0 +
p∑
i=1
βizt−i(α) + x′t−1θ + ut, t = 1, . . . , T. (A.3)
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In (A.3) xt−1 ∈ Ωt−1 is a q-dimensional vector of predetermined variables. Let
zt = (1, zt−1, . . . , zt−p,x′t−1)
′ and, accordingly, δ = (β0,β′,θ)′ with β = (β1, . . . , βp)′.
For the purpose of VaR diagnosis the joint null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 is tested





d→ χ2(p+ q + 1). (A.4)
In (A.4) Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zT )
′ collects the explanatory variables and δˆ is the vector
of OLS parameter estimates. The asymptotic distribution in (A.4) holds under
H0.
Clements & Taylor (2003) and Patton (2006) point out that the dependent
variable in (A.3) is binary and, thus, a logit (or probit) regression model is more
appropriate to infer on the explanatory content of the right hand side variables
in (A.3). To set out the LR approach define an uncentered hit function
z˜t(α) = I(yt < −VaRt(α)|Ωt−1). (A.5)





∆lt = lt (β0 = ln(α/(1− α)),β = 0,θ = 0|z˜t, z˜t)− lt(δ|z˜t, z˜t)) (A.6)
d→ χ2(p+ q + 1),
where z˜t = (1, z˜t−1, . . . , z˜t−p,x′t−1)
′ is the vector of explanatory variables and lt is
the log likelihood function to be maximized, e.g. by means of a logit regression.
A.2.1 Resampling the DQ-statistic
Conditional on some small α, α = 0.01 say, an event zt(α) = 1− α is rarely ob-
served. In this case the actual significance levels of the statistic in (A.4) might dif-
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fer substantially from the nominal level in finite samples. In such cases bootstrap
algorithms could be seen as a promising alternative to first order asymptotic ap-
proximations that often show faster convergence of actual to nominal significance
levels. Recently, Herwartz & Xu (2009) have introduced a bootstrap procedure
that could be adopted for VaR diagnosis. To determine critical values for DQα
with nominal significance level γ, it consists of the following steps:
1. Draw bootstrap samples {z∗t (α)}Tt=1 from {zt(α)}Tt=1 without replacement.







3. Steps (1) and (2) are performed B times with B sufficiently large. Reject
H0 with if DQα exceeds the (1− γ) quantile of {DQ∗α}Bb=1.
A.3 Monte-Carlo Study
This section provides a performance comparison of the bootstrap approach to
the DQ-test with the asymptotic approximations of DQ and the logit LR-test.
Throughout, MC exercises cover 10000 replications with the number of bootstrap
draws B = 499. Empirical rejection frequencies are determined for distinct VaR
coverage levels α (ordered from 0.5% to 5%), for nominal significance levels γ =
1%, 5% and sample sizes T = 3000, 5000, 10000.
A.3.1 The simulation design
For simulations under H0 zt(α) is determined by means of iid Gaussian vari-
ates. Let Φ(•) denote the Gaussian distribution function. Then, centered and
uncentered hit processes are, respectively,
zt(α) = I(ξt < Φ




To investigate empirical power features (H1), the ξt process in (A.7) is replaced by
a first order autoregression with unconditional unit variance, i.e. ξt = 0.1ξt−1 +
ζt, ζt ∼ iidN(0, 0.99).
An often raised caveat of Monte Carlo results is their dependence upon the
data generating processes used for simulation. For the case of simulating VaR hits
under the null hypothesis of a well specified risk model, it is worthwhile to point
out that the design in (A.7) matches the null hypothesis in a one-to-one manner.
Competing, well specified VaR models imitating the null hypothesis would not
deliver systematically different empirical size features of test procedures. The
data generating mechanism applied to imitate a poor VaR specification (H1)
lacks parametric rigor, but it will be interesting to investigate how alternative
diagnostic tools cope with a ‘nonparametric’ alternative.
Specifying equation (A.3) we consider an autoregressive model of order p = 5,
i.e.
zt(α) = β0 +
5∑
i=1
βizt−i(α) + ut. (A.8)
A.3.2 Empirical size and power
Simulation results are documented in Table A.1. Conditional on a small nominal
VaR coverage (α = .005, .01, .015) common asymptotic approaches to VaR diag-
nosis either show huge empirical size distortions or deserve rather large dimen-
sional sample information. For instance, at the 5% nominal significance level,
the empirical levels of DQ.01 and LR.01 are 11.25% and 1.63% (T = 3000) or
6.75% and 3.70% (T = 10000), respectively. While size distortions for the DQα
test amount to oversizing throughout, the LR approach features both signifi-
cant over- and undersizing depending on the VaR coverage subjected to testing.
Throughout, generating critical values for DQα by means of resampling offers
empirical size levels which are considerably closer to the nominal level of the test.
To mention an extreme case compare the empirical size for the DQ.005 and its
bootstrap counterpart which are 19.29% and 3.47% (T = 3000) or 12.63% and
5.03% (T = 10000), respectively. For diagnosing VaRt(0.025) specifications boot-
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strap inference yields for all considered sample sizes empirical significance levels
insignificantly close to γ = 0.05. It is noteworthy that for most practical issues
the considered nominal VaR coverage is typically small, 1% or less say.
As documented in the bottom panel of Table A.1 all test procedures show
empirical power since rejection frequencies are uniformly higher under the non-
parametric alternative in comparison with H0. In light of most preferable size
features of the resampling approach the latter is clearly recommendable for fi-
nancial practice.
A.4 Conclusion
A bootstrap approach to determine critical values for the DQ-test (Engle & Man-
ganelli, 2004b) is shown to have preferable empirical size features than the asymp-
totic approximation of the test in finite samples. It is also preferable to a like-
lihood ratio test based on logit regressions (Clements & Taylor, 2003; Patton,
2006). The merits of the resampling scheme are particularly relevant for diagnos-






0.5% 1% 1.5% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5%
Size estimates
DQα 3000 19.29 11.25 7.77 6.54 6.11 5.78 4.72 5.17
LRα 0.81 1.63 2.58 4.31 6.58 6.73 6.30 5.75
DQ∗α 3.47 4.12 4.47 4.71 4.82 4.93 4.43 4.80
DQα 5000 9.03 8.70 6.56 6.09 5.69 5.10 4.72 5.15
LRα 0.84 2.45 4.42 6.77 7.08 6.94 5.66 5.79
DQ∗α 4.14 4.58 5.15 5.05 5.15 4.84 4.61 5.11
DQα 10000 12.63 6.75 6.07 5.40 4.89 4.87 4.54 5.06
LRα 1.46 3.70 6.84 7.14 6.02 5.70 5.06 5.28
DQ∗α 5.03 5.13 5.29 4.59 4.54 4.81 4.82 5.15
DQα 3000 9.54 4.25 2.89 2.45 1.93 1.88 1.44 1.22
LRα 0.14 0.26 0.35 0.66 1.04 1.38 1.23 1.43
DQ∗α 0.62 1.01 0.89 0.92 0.96 1.05 1.11 0.94
DQα 5000 5.20 3.47 2.50 2.09 1.65 1.40 1.23 1.31
LRα 0.11 0.38 0.51 1.10 1.41 1.54 1.23 0.99
DQ∗α 0.85 1.04 1.11 1.17 1.04 0.88 1.01 1.12
DQα 10000 4.15 2.51 1.79 1.44 1.48 1.12 1.13 0.95
LRα 0.18 0.59 1.24 1.34 1.18 1.10 1.25 1.00
DQ∗α 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.07 1.19 0.90 1.19 0.92
Power estimates
DQα 3000 22.87 16.87 13.93 12.57 12.67 13.19 15.08 16.14
LRα 1.33 3.07 5.55 8.41 10.75 11.33 11.91 14.39
DQ∗α 4.55 7.11 8.77 9.97 10.68 11.97 14.59 16.34
DQα 5000 13.55 15.29 14.15 15.80 16.51 18.01 21.80 25.38
LRα 1.68 5.18 8.89 11.48 13.28 14.72 16.86 20.86
DQ∗α 6.94 8.88 11.68 14.48 15.45 17.60 22.64 26.22
DQα 10000 20.32 15.84 18.41 21.18 24.12 28.75 37.11 45.26
LRα 3.10 8.98 13.59 15.95 19.13 22.80 30.74 39.91
DQ∗α 8.78 12.57 17.08 20.46 24.42 29.28 38.49 47.00
Table A.1: Upper and medium panel: Empirical size estimates (in per-
centage points) for alternative nominal significance levels, γ = 5%, 1%,
sample sizes T = 3000, 5000, 10000 and VaR coverage levels α =
.005, .01, .015, .02, .025, .030, .040, .050. DQα and LRα are asymptotic tests, and
DQ∗α is the bootstrap counterpart of DQα. The null hypothesis of a well cali-
brated VaR model is rejected if DQα > χ
2
6, LRα > χ
2
6 or DQα exceeds the (1−γ)
quantile of the corresponding bootstrap distribution. Bottom panel: Power esti-
mates with respect to the nominal 5% significance level.
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